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ARTICLE
PROCESS PREEMPTION IN FEDERAL
SITING REGIMES
ASHIRA PELMAN OSTROW*
Land use regulation has historically been a function of local governments.
Congress left land use to the states; the states, in turn, empowered municipalities to enact zoning laws to guide planning and development decisions. Today,
however, formal distinctions between state andfederal spheres of power have
been supplanted by an interjurisdictionalunderstanding offederalism, in which
local authority to regulate land overlaps with federal and state authority. Accordingly, Congress has experimented with a variety of policies aimed at compelling local governments to site nationally relevant facilities. Federal siting
regimes have ranged from federal delegation of regulatory authority to the
states, on one end of the spectrum, to unitaryfederal preemption of state control,
vesting exclusive siting authority in a federal administrative agency, on the
other.
This Article advances a more balanced approachto facilities siting termed
"Process Preemption." In a ProcessPreemption regime, Congress imposes federal constraintson the siting process, but leaves primary decisionmaking power
in the hands of local regulators. This Article argues that Process Preemption
has the potential to further the effectiveness of federal land use policies because
(a) its hybridfederal-localframework accounts for the interjurisdictionalnature
of a federal siting policy, effectively balancing national and local land use priorities, and (b) its emphasis on procedure increases the legitimacy, consistency,
and ultimate public acceptance of controversialsiting decisions.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Historically, land use regulation has been considered a matter of local
concern. The federal government left land use to the states; the states, in
turn, empowered municipalities to enact zoning laws to guide planning and
development decisions.' Today, however, formal distinctions between state
and federal spheres of power have been supplanted by an interjurisdictional
understanding of federalism, in which local authority to regulate land over* Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra Law School. B.A., University of Pennsylvania,
1999; J.D., Columbia Law School, 2003. This Article is the Winner of the 2011 American
Association of Law Schools' Scholarly Paper Competition. The author is grateful for the
thoughtful comments and suggestions of Bo Abrams, Nestor Davidson, Joshua Fershee, Joel
Goldstein, Susan Lorde Martin, Adam Macleod, Ryan Ostrow, Adinah Pelman, David Rubenstein, Patty Salkin, Peter Salsich, Rose Villazor, Michael Wolf and especially, Erin Ryan, as
well as to participants in the 2010 Southeast Association of Law Schools' New Scholars program and Hofstra Law School's Junior Faculty Forum and Summer Workshop Series. The
author would also like to thank her outstanding research assistant, David L. Schwed, and her
reference librarian at Hofstra Law School, Kevin Shelton, for their help with this project.

'Patricia Salkin & John R. Nolon, PracticallyGrounded: Convergence of Land Use Law
Pedagogy and Best Practices, 60 J. LEGAL EDuc. 519, 523 (2011).
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laps with federal and state authority.' Indeed, modem land use law involves
a significant federal dimension,' resulting in part from the enactment of a
number of key federal statutes that have varying degrees of preemptive effect on local authority. 4
This Article identifies an innovative framework for ordering federallocal interactions in land use law that was first articulated by Congress in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("TCA"). This framework empowers local governments to make primary siting decisions, subject to federal constraints on the decisionmaking process. Because this hybrid approach
imposes substantive and procedural constraints on the local land use process,
this Article terms it "Process Preemption."6 By respecting the traditional
division of powers in land use law, Process Preemption accounts for the
interjurisdictional nature of federal policies that impact local land use.'
Moreover, in authorizing local implementation of a national program, Process Preemption encourages diversity within a federal framework and
achieves a delicate and effective balance of federal and local interests in land
use law.
In contrast, federal preemption regimes that place siting authority entirely within one level of government miss this interjurisdictional dynamic
2 See, e.g., Robert R. M. Verchick & Nina Mendelson, Preemption and Theories of Federalism, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISMS CORE

QUESTION 13, 14 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009) [hereinafter PREEMPTION CHOICE] ("[T]he
modem understanding of the Constitution's provisions leaves generous room for state and federal overlap."); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 225 (2000) ("The powers of
the federal government and the powers of the states overlap enormously."); Robert A.
Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism,91 IOWA L. REv. 243 (2005) (proposing
modem theory of interactive, or polyphonic, federalism).
Federal constitutional authority to enact policies that impact land use stems from a number of enumerated powers, including the power to regulate interstate commerce, the taxing and
spending power, and the Fourteenth Amendment. John R. Nolon, Historical Overview of the
American Land Use System: A Diagnostic Approach to Evaluating Governmental Land Use
Control, 23 PACE ENvTL. L. REV. 821, 826-29 (2006).
4 Salkin & Nolon, supra note 1, at 523 (citing Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2006); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(2006); Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (2006)); Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2006)).
See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7) (2006).
6 Process Preemption is a form of conflict preemption by which state and local regulations
that conflict with federal siting standards are preempted. See Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt.
Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (defining conflict preemption and listing general categories of
preemption); see also Verchick & Mendelson, supra note 2, at 21-22 (describing the forms of
preemption, including express, conflict, obstacle, and field).
' Interjurisdictional regulatory problems often arise when federal regulation of a national
interest overlaps with the core local authority to regulate local land use or when the traditionally local police power obligation to protect local health and safety overlaps with the national
interest in protecting national infrastructure and regulating interstate effects. Erin Ryan, Feder-

alism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the InterjurisdictionalGray

Area, 66 MD. L. REv. 503, 567-68, 573 (2007). This tension, which can generate regulatory
gaps for interjurisdictional problems like urban sprawl and global warming, has been termed
the "regulatory commons problem." See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REv. 1, 5 n.5 (2003).
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and often fail to achieve federal land use goals. Aggressive federal preemption regimes that exclude local decisionmakers from the siting process falter
because local opposition, in contrast to local authority, cannot be
preempted.'
At the same time, federal siting regimes that permit states to exclusively empower local decisionmakers also fail to achieve federal goals. Particularly with regard to unpopular land use decisions, locally elected officials
tend to focus on the well being of their own residents to the exclusion (and
detriment) of outsiders. 9 In the absence of countervailing federal or state
policy, there is no mechanism through which to compel local decisionmakers to consider regional or federal interests in their decisionmaking
process.' 0 Localities are therefore free to shape their communities, permitting those land uses deemed desirable and excluding others.
This Article develops a theory of Process Preemption through a comparison of federal statutes regulating the siting of nationally significant, but
locally undesirable, facilities. In the 1980s, Congress adopted two diametrically opposed strategies for siting radioactive waste disposal facilities (collectively, the "Waste Siting Policies"). For high-level radioactive waste,"
Congress adopted an aggressively preemptive approach, expressly designating federally owned property at Yucca Mountain, Nevada as the site for a
single national high-level waste facility. 2 Though the site was chosen in
1988 and formally approved by Congress and the President in 2002, it was

I Gail Bingham & Daniel S. Miller, Prospectsfor Resolving Hazardous Waste Siting Disputes Through Negotiation, 17 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 473, 477 (1984); see also Richard C.
Kearney, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management: EnvironmentalPolicy, Federalism, and
New York, 23 PusLIus: J. FEDERALISM 57, 63 (1993) (noting that unitary preemption of local
authority invariably fails in the face of local opposition); Don Munton, Introduction: The
NIMBY Phenomenon and Approaches to Facility Siting, in

HAZARDOUS WASTE

SITING

AND

DEMoCRATIc CHOICE 12 (Don Munton ed., 1996) (noting that preemption strategies are fatally
flawed because preemption of local permitting authority does not strip local officials of political authority).
9

See, e.g.,

MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, THE ZONING OF AMERICA: EUCLID V. AMBLER

138-43,

146-49 (2008) (describing local government parochialism regarding land use); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: PartII-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 453 (1990)

(highlighting the exclusionary impact of local autonomy); Christopher Serkin, Big Differences
for Small Governments: Local Governments and the Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1624,

1646 (2006) (describing the majoritarian nature of local government decisions regarding land
use).
1oSee infra notes 49-56.

" High-level radioactive wastes include spent reactor fuel and waste materials remaining
after spent fuel is reprocessed. High-Level Waste, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, http://
www.nrc.gov/waste/high-level-waste.html (last updated July 13, 2010).
12 Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987 ("NWPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 10172 (2006);
see also Marta Adams, Yucca Mountain-Nevada's Perspective, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 423,
425-28 (2010) (describing history of NWPA). See generally U.S. Govr ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-10-48, NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT: KEY ATrRIBUTES, CHALLENGES AND
COSTS FOR THE YUCCA MOUNTAIN REPOSITORY AND Two POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVES (2009)

[hereinafter GAO

NUCLEAR WASTE].
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met with continuous legal and political challenges and was ultimately abandoned in 2009.'1
For low-level radioactive waste ("LLW"),14 Congress expressly empowered states to site disposal facilities, individually or through interstate
compacts, with limited federal interference." Despite the fact that the states
supported the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980 and its 1985
Amendments (collectively, the "LLW Act"),' 6 the Act is widely regarded as
a failure.' In the decades since the LLW Act was passed, not one additional
LLW disposal facility has been sited pursuant to the interstate compacts authorized by the Act despite numerous siting attempts.'"
In contrast to the Waste Siting Policies, the TCA's siting policy ("Telecommunications Siting Policy") 9 adopts a more balanced interjurisdictional
" FY 2010 AppropriationsHearing Before the S. Comm. on Appropriations, I 11th Cong.
10-11 (2009) [hereinafter AppropriationsHearing] (statement of Steven Chu, Secretary, U.S.
Dep't of Energy); see also Josef H. Hebert, Obama Team Says No Nuclear Waste at Yucca,
Cin. TRIB., Mar. 6, 2009, at Cll; Bradford Plumer, The Wasteland, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 29,

2010, at 14.
4 Low-level waste includes items that have become contaminated with radioactive material, including protective shoe covers and clothing, wiping rags, equipment and tools, luminous
dials, swabs, syringes, and laboratory animal carcasses. Low Level Waste, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, http://www.nrc.gov/wastellow-level-waste.html (last updated Feb. 13,
2007).
'5 For further discussion, see infra Part IV.A.2.
" Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b2021j (2006); Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 202lb-2021d
(2006). The National Governor's Association and the National Conference of State Legislatures endorsed regional sharing of low-level waste. Richard C. Kearney & Robert B. Garey,
American Federalism and the Management of Radioactive Wastes, 42 PUB.

ADMIN.

REV. 14,

20 (1982).
" See Michael B. Gerrard, Fear and Loathing in the Siting of Hazardous and Radioactive
Waste Facilities:A Comprehensive Approach to a Misperceived Crisis, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1047,

1050 (1994) ("Few laws have failed so completely as the federal and state statutes designed to
create new facilities for the disposal of hazardous and radioactive waste."); see also Erin
Ryan, Federalismat the Cathedral:Property Rules, Liability Rules, and InalienabilityRules in

Tenth Amendment Infrastructure,81 U. CoLo. L. REv. 1, 50-51 (2010) (describing failure of
the LLW Act); Gregory B. Jaczko, Comm'r, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, Remarks at the
Electric Power Research Institute's 2007 International Low Level Waste Conference and Exhibit Show: The Need for Alternatives in Low Level Radioactive Waste Disposal (Jun. 26,
2007), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/speeches/
2007/S-07-033.html ("I do not believe that the overarching objectives of the acts will ever be
realized.").
" See Low-Level Waste Disposal: What We Regulate, U.S.

NUCLEAR

REGULATORY

http://www.nrc.gov/waste/llw-disposal.html (last updated Feb. 28, 2011) ("Most
states have entered into compacts; however, no new disposal facilities have been built since
the Act was passed."). Although no new facilities have been sited through the LLW Act, one
privately owned, pre-existing facility in Clive, Utah was licensed to accept the least hazardous
radioactive waste. M.R. Ledoux & M.S. Cade, Licensing and Operations of the Clive, Utah
Low-level Containerized Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility-A Continuation of Excellence
(paper presented at the Waste Management Conference, Feb. 22-24, 2002, Tucson, Ariz.),
http://www.wmsym.org/archives/2002/Proceedings/13/324.pdf. See generally U.S. GEN. AcCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-604, Low-LEvEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE: DISPOSAL AVAILABILITY
COMM'N,

ADEQUATE
SHORTFALLS

IN

THE SHORT TERM,

BUT OVERSIGHT

NEEDED TO IDENTIFY ANY
WASTE].

20-21 (2004) [hereinafter GAO Low-LEVEL

" Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7) (2006).

FUTURE
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approach that leaves primary siting authority in the hands of local regulators,
but places explicit substantive and procedural constraints on the decisionmaking process. In effect, the Telecommunications Siting Policy preempts
the siting process, without disempowering local governments. 20 Overall, the
TCA's Process Preemption regime has succeeded in achieving its federal
land use goals. Since the Act was passed, the number of cell towers sited
across the country has increased dramatically, contributing to the development of a national telecommunications network. 21 Moreover, the TCA's hybrid federal-local framework has encouraged local regulators to cooperate
with land use developers. 22
Admittedly, it is difficult to draw generalized conclusions from a comparison of these siting regimes because radioactive waste disposal facilities
are fundamentally different from cell phone towers. Indeed, this Article
readily concedes that Process Preemption alone is not likely to overcome the
entrenched local opposition to centralized radioactive waste disposal
facilities.23
Notwithstanding this limitation, this Article argues that the TCA's Process Preemption approach has two distinct advantages over the earlier Waste
Siting Policies. First, Process Preemption's hybrid federal-local framework
accounts for the interjurisdictional nature of a federal siting policy, effectively balancing national and local land use priorities. Second, by placing
procedural constraints on the local decision-making process-including the
requirement that decisions be made within a reasonable period of time, supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record, and subject to
federal judicial review-Process Preemption increases the legitimacy, consistency, and public acceptance of controversial siting decisions.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II explains why local governments have historically been empowered to regulate the use and development of land and analyzes the impact of federal preemption on local
authority. Part III situates preemptive federal siting policies within the wider
20 In particular, the Telecommunications Siting Policy contains both floor preemption provisions, which preempt local decisions that are inconsistent with or fail to meet the minimum
federal procedural requirements, as well as ceiling preemption provisions, which preempt local
decisions that are more restrictive than the federal standard. See William W. Buzbee, Asymmet-

rical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV.

1547, 1553-54, 1573-75 (2007).
21 Since the passage of the act, the number of cell towers has increased from under 20,000
in 1995 to over 250,000 in 2010. Wireless Quick Facts, CTIA: THE WIRELESS AssoCIATION,
http://www.ctia.org/advocacy/research/index.cfm/AID/10323 (last visited Mar. 5, 2011); see
also T-Mobile Cent., LLC v. Unified Gov't of Wyandotte County/Kansas City, 546 F.3d 1299,
1306 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that the TCA has furthered federal telecommunications goals
"by reducing the impediments that local governments could impose to defeat or delay the
installation of wireless communications facilities such as cell phone towers, and by protecting
against 'irrational or substanceless decisions by local authorities"').
22 John Copeland Nagle, Cell Phone Towers as Visual Pollution, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETmIcs & PuB. POL'Y 537, 564 (2009) (noting that the siting policy encourages cooperation
between cellular companies and local communities).
23

See infra Part V.C.
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debate over federal preemption, highlighting the advantages of a national
land use policy that leaves ample room for local tailoring and diversity. Part
IV analyzes three federal siting regimes that run the gamut from complete
preemption to complete delegation. On the basis of this analysis, Part V
argues that Process Preemption, an interjurisdictional approach that utilizes a
mix of federal and local regulatory actors, has the potential to aid policymakers in addressing a variety of siting conflicts, including those currently
arising in connection with the development of alternative and renewable energy sources.2 4

II. OF

FEDERAL LAW AND

LocAL LAND

Land use has long been considered the mainstay of local government
power.25 From its humble beginning as a way for urban municipalities to
prevent overcrowding and segregate incompatible uses, to its current concern with aesthetics and "smart growth," 26 zoning is the primary method
through which local communities regulate development and express community preferences and character. Local officials, both part of and accountable
to the local community, are generally thought to be in the best position to
respond to community land use preferences. As the New Jersey Supreme
Court noted in an early zoning case, "local officials who are thoroughly
familiar with their community's characteristics and interests and are the
proper representatives of its people are undoubtedly the best equipped to
pass initially on [zoning requests]."27
This Part explores the relationship between federal preemption and local land use law. Section A explains why land use regulation has historically
been delegated to local governments. Section B analyzes the way in which
federal preemption of local land use laws impacts the local planning and
zoning process.
24

Despite national support, alternative and renewable energy projects often face intense

opposition at the local level. Sara C. Bronin, Curbing Energy Sprawl with Microgrids, 43

CONN. L. REV. 547, 571-72 (2011) (describing local opposition to renewable and alternative
energy projects, including wind and solar installations); Christopher M. Crane, State Authority
in Siting of Liquefied Natural Gas Import Terminals, 14 Bur. ENvTL. L.J. 1, 5-8 (2006)
(describing public opposition to liquefied natural gas ("LNG") siting); see also infra Part V.C.
2

Richard Briffault, The Role of Local Control in School FinanceReform, 24 CONN. L.

REv. 773, 784 n.48 (1992) (describing land use as "the most important local regulatory
power"); GARY D. TAYLOR & MARK A. WYCKOFF, Intergovernmental Zoning Conflicts over
Public Facilities Siting: A Model Framework for Standard State Acts, 41 URB. LAW. 653,

659-60 (2009) (finding continuing local primacy in land use regulation).
26 Smart Growth is an urban planning and transportation theory that promotes compact
development. See generally STUART MECK, GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK:
OF CHANGE (2002), available at

MODEL STATUTES FOR PLANNING AND THE MANAGEMENT

http://www.planning.org/growingsmart/guidebook/print/index.htm; Patricia E. Salkin, Smart
Growth and Sustainable Development: Threads of a National Land Use Policy, 36 VAL. U. L.

REv. 381 passim (2002) (describing smart growth policies at the federal, state, and local levels
of government).
27 Ward v. Scott, 105 A.2d 851, 855 (N.J. 1954).
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Why Local Governments Regulate Land Use

Federal preemption of property rights stands in direct contrast to a long
history of empowering local governments to regulate land use.28 From its
inception, zoning has provided a means for local communities to address
urban problems and coordinate growth. 29 Early land use ordinances were
limited in scope, focusing on fire prevention and building standards,30 or on
restricting noxious uses from residential neighborhoods." By the end of the
19th century, however, municipalities became increasingly concerned about
the general compatibility of land uses within their borders.32 By separating
residential districts from commercial and industrial areas, early city planners
hoped to stabilize neighborhoods and protect property values.33
In 1916, New York City adopted a widely publicized comprehensive
zoning ordinance, prompting then-Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover
to establish a committee to study zoning.3 4 In 1922, the zoning committee
promulgated the Standard State Zone Enabling Act ("SZEA")3 5 to aid states
in authorizing municipalities to adopt zoning ordinances. In the landmark
1926 case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,36 the Supreme Court

28 See William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem Of Institutional
Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 97 (1999) (noting that "land use decisions have re-

mained quintessentially within the province of local governments"); William Fischel, The
Evolution of Zoning since the 1980s: The Persistenceof Localism § 3 (Dartmouth Coll.-Dep't
of Econ., Working Paper, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1686009 (describing
persistence of localism in zoning despite federalization of other formerly local functions). See
generally 1 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AM. LAW ZONING § 3:1 (5th ed. 2008).
29

See Shelby D. Green, The Searchfor A NationalLand Use Policy: Forthe Cities' Sake,

26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 69, 81-82 (1998) (noting that cities were the first to systematically
consider developing urban infrastructure); Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Judicial Review of Local
Land Use Decisions: Lessons from RLUIPA, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 717, 734-37 (2008)
rise of zoning in response to urban conditions).
(describing
30
See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 75 (3rd ed. 2005); Charles L. Siemon, The Paradox of "In Accordance with a
Comprehensive Plan" and Post Hoc Rationalization:The Needfor Efficient and Effective Judicial Review of Land Use Regulations, 16 STETSON L. REV. 603, 607 (1987) (noting that prior

to the Civil War, "local land use controls were limited in focus and generally related to fire
and building standards"). But see John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance

for Modem Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1252, 1289-93 (1996) (documenting extensive land regulation during the colonial period).
" See, e.g., In re Hang Kie, 10 P. 327 (Cal. 1886) (ordinance restricting operation of
laundries); Shea v. City of Muncie, 46 N.E. 138 (Ind. 1897) (ordinance restricting operation of
taverns and liquor stores); Cronin v. People, 82 N.Y. 318 (1880) (ordinance restricting operation of slaughterhouses).
32 Ostrow, supra note 29, at 734-37.
3 Id. at 728 & n.43 (citing J. Gregory Richards, Zoning for Direct Social Control, 1982
DuKE L.J. 761, 762).
34 WOLF, supra note 9, at 26-31 (describing rise of zoning and role of New York's ordinance); Richard H. Chused, Euclid's HistoricalImagery, 51 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 597, 598
(2001).
3 ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING, U.S. DEPr OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING
ENABLING Acr (rev.
36 272 U.S. 365

ed. 1926).

(1926).
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upheld the validity of zoning as a valid exercise of the police power.17 Recognizing the need to coordinate development in rapidly changing urban
communities, the Court stated:
Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; but with
the great increase and concentration of population, problems have
developed, and constantly are developing, which require, and will
continue to require, additional restrictions in respect of the use and
occupation of private lands in urban communities ... . Such regulations are sustained, under the complex conditions of our day, for
reasons analogous to those which justify traffic regulations, which,
before the advent of automobiles and rapid transit street railways,
would have been condemned as fatally arbitrary and
unreasonable.38
With the Supreme Court's approval, the practice of zoning spread rapidly.
By 1930, thirty-five states had passed enabling acts authorizing localities to
zone.3 9
That local governments were primarily empowered to regulate land is
not a historical accident. Rather, local primacy in this area of law stems from
a practical recognition that local governments are institutionally better suited
to this task than are higher levels of government. 40 Local and county governments are often the only levels of government that have the capacity to discover and act on the preferences of local constituencies. 4 ' The federal
government lacks the detailed knowledge necessary for local land use planning and cannot possibly bear the aggregate cost of administering local land
use policies. 42 As the Ohio Supreme Court observed in upholding a local
zoning ordinance, "it is better to leave the formulation and implementation
of zoning policy to the city council, or other legislative body, which has not

" Id. at 389. The Court expressly noted that "the village, though physically a suburb of
Cleveland, is politically a separate municipality, with powers of its own and authority to govern itself as it sees fit within the limits of the organic law of its creation and the State and
Federal Constitutions." Id.
38 Id. at 386-87.
* ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 30, at 76; WOLF, supra note 9, at 121-34.
4 Buzbee, supra note 28, at 94; see also Nolon, supra note 3, at 853 (listing reasons for
local control over land use including its long-standing history, variation in local economic
markets and environments, capacity of local citizens and politicians to respond to local conditions, and ability to implement federal and state initiatives).
4" Buzbee, supra note 28, at 92; Marci A. Hamilton, Federalismand the Public Good: The
True Story Behind the Religious Land Use and InstitutionalizedPersons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311,
335 (2003) (noting that by "keeping land use law local, citizens have more direct access to
their representative . . . and a proportionally larger voice in the land use process that directly
affects them").
42 See John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L.
REV. 1183, 1218 (1995) (arguing that only local governments have the detailed local knowledge and resources necessary to administer programs implicating land use); Philip J. Weiser,
Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1692, 1699-1700 (2001) (same).
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only the expertise and staff, but also, the constitutional responsibility to police this area effectively." 43
Moreover, land, by its nature, is inherently local. It exists within definite metes and bounds and cannot be moved. As a result, its uses often have
a greater impact on those living nearby than on those living far away.44 For
example, a decision to site a telecommunications tower or hazardous waste
facility in one community has a significantly greater impact on the aesthetics, property values, health and safety, and character of the sited community
than on other communities. 45 Similarly, collective decisions regarding the
permissible uses of land, such as whether to permit a church in a commercial
district or whether to permit homes to be painted pink, are an essential part
of how communities develop their character and pursue common goals. 46
Thus, local officials, who are a part of the community and are accountable to
it, are often in the best position to guide the use and development of land.
B.

How Federal Preemption Alters Local Land Use

Federal preemption of local land use regulation has two direct and interrelated effects on local governments. First, federal preemption of land use
regulations compels local authorities to consider national interests in their
decision-making process. Second, federal preemption subsidizes the land use
promoted under the federal scheme by reducing (or eliminating) the costs
associated with obtaining local land use permits. To illustrate, the federal
Fair Housing Act ("FHA") 47 has been interpreted to require local governments to modify their zoning codes to accommodate group homes for handicapped individuals. 48 The Fair Housing Act thus (1) compels local
governments to consider the federal interest in assuring adequate housing for
4 Leslie v. City of Toledo, 423 N.E.2d 123, 125 (Ohio 1981); see also Oak Park Trust &
Say. Bank v. City of Chicago, 438 N.E.2d 630, 635 (1ll. App. Ct. 1982) ("It is within the
province of the local municipal body to determine the uses of property and establish zoning
classifications.").
" Dwyer, supra note 42, at 1218 (describing intense conflict over land use at local level
because burdens of use are felt most directly by those living near the land); Hamilton, supra
note 41, at 335 (noting that land use decisions are primarily local because they have a greater
impact on those living near the land); cf. Eduardo M. Pefialver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 821, 828-32 (2009) (emphasizing the psychological attachments to land that develop in
connection with the local activities conducted on the land).
45 Indeed, some studies have demonstrated a correlation between declining property values and the proximity of the home to a waste disposal facility. See Gerrard,supra note 17, at
1109-10.
* Hamilton, supra note 41, at 335.
1 Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006).
48 See, e.g., Oxford House, Inc. v. Twp. of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450, 458 (D.N.J.
1992) (granting alcoholics' and drug addicts' request for an injunction against the town's zoning ordinance prohibiting them from occupying a group house); Ass'n of Relatives and Friends
of AIDS Patients (A.F.A.P.S.) v. Regulations and Penmits Admin. or Administracion de Reglamentos y Permisos (A.R.P.E.), 740 F. Supp. 95 (D.P.R. 1990) (enjoining the municipality from
refusing to issue a special use permit for the operation of a hospice for terminally-ill AIDS
patients).
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handicapped persons and (2) creates a subsidy for handicapped persons by
eliminating, or reducing, the need for such persons to obtain zoning related
permits. In enacting a statute that constrains local zoning discretion, Congress, in effect, determines that the protected land use is deserving of a subsidy and that the national interest in the protected land use should be
weighed against the local interest in regulating development.
1.

Mandating Local Considerationof Extra-Local Concerns

Critics of local land use have long worried about local governments'
tendency to focus exclusively on the well-being of its own residents, often to
the detriment of outsiders. Modern scholars have expressed concern that local regulatory decisions in a variety of substantive areas "have external effects on neighboring communities, shaping regional economies without any
imperative that the extraterritorial consequences of local decision-making be
taken into account." 4 9 Reliance on local government to regulate land use has
been blamed for a variety of social problems, including urban sprawl, environmental injustice, racial segregation, lack of affordable housing, and conflicting land uses at municipal borders. 0 Indeed, the capacity for local
decision-makers to respond to community preferences, often touted as a
democratic benefit of local land use regulation, creates a double-edged
sword: in many contexts, community preferences conflict with broader regional and national needs." For example, a community might resist siting a
low-income housing development or sewer treatment plant despite a recognized regional need.
Local resistance to unpopular developments is a well-known phenomenon, commonly shorthanded as "NIMBY," an acronym for Not In My
Backyard.52 NIMBYs object to further development within their communities, fearing that such development might reduce the market value of their
49 Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-LocalCooperation in an Era of
State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 1024 (2007); see also Herbert Wechsler, Forewordto
MODEL LAND DEV. CODE X (Am. Law Inst. 1976) (noting that the SZEA, "when it is applied
by local governments within a region, tends to disregard the greater interests of the regional
community and in many instances fails to recognize and protect valid local needs").
s Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Structure of the Land Use Regulatory System in the
United States, 22 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 441, 442-43 (2007); see also Wolf, supra note 9,
at 147-48 (noting that zoning law insulates "local, self-interested efforts" to exclude beneficial facilities from legal challenge).
' Jerold S. Kayden, National Land-Use Planningin America: Something Whose Time Has
Never Come, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 445, 449-50 (2000) (describing primacy of local regulation even when such regulation conflicts with regional needs).
52 See William A. Fischel, Voting, Risk Aversion, and the NIMBY Syndrome: A Comment
on Robert Nelson's "Privatizing the Neighborhood", 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 881, 884-85
(1999) (providing economic explanation for NIMBYism); Munton, supra note 8, at 2-3
(describing roots of NIMBYism); Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Minority Interests,Majority Politics:
A Comment on Richard Collins' "Telluride's Tale of Eminent Domain, Home Rule, and Retroactivity", 86 DENv. U. L. REv. 1459, 1467-68 (2009) (illustrating the impact of NIMBYism in
preventing arguably beneficial facilities from being constructed outside of Telluride).
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homes or change the character of the community.53 NIMBYism presents a
challenge to social and political programs that require local government cooperation. According to William Fischel:
NIMBYs show up at the zoning and planning board reviews, to
which almost all developers of more-than-minor subdivisions must
submit. If NIMBYs fail to reduce the scale and density of the project at these reviews, they often deploy alternative regulatory rationales, such as environmental impact statements, historic districts,
aboriginal burial sites, agricultural preservation, wetlands, flood
plains, access for the disabled and protection of (often unidentified) endangered species at other local, state and federal government forums, including courts of law .. .. And if NIMBYs fail in

these efforts, they seek, often by direct democratic initiatives, to
have the local zoning and planning regulations changed to make
4
sure that similar developments do not happen again.1
NIMBYism results from the local political market's failure to account
for the external impacts of local zoning decisions." Though a region may
desperately need additional low-income housing, the individuals who would
benefit from such housing are largely absent from the local jurisdiction and
unable to participate in the decisionmaking process. Traditional land use law
provides no mechanism through which to force local governments to consider these external or underrepresented interests. 6 According to Thomas
Merrill:
NIMBY presents a classic prisoners dilemma. Everyone has an incentive to export the costs of an activity (such as a locally undesirable land use), but if everyone pursues this strategy, the benefits of
the activity are lost to all. Federal regulation that permits weighing
the costs and benefits of the activity in question as part of an overall strategy seems to be a logical response. 7
" Patricia E. Salkin & Ashira Pelman Ostrow, CooperativeFederalismand Wind: A New
Framework for Achieving Sustainability, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1049, 1052 (2009); see also
Serkin, supra note 9, at 1656 (arguing that NIMBYs are motivated both by a desire to protect
property values and by a desire to preserve community character).
5 Fischel, supra note 52, at 881-82.
5 Id. at 891; see also Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumptionof
Constitutionality in Land-Use Law, 24 URB. LAW. 1, 6 (1992) (noting that the difficulty in
siting locally undesirable land uses ("LULUs") represents a higher level of market failure than
the typical land use case); John R. Nolon, Champions of Change: Reinventing Democracy
Through Land Law Reform, 30 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 1, 16 (2006) ("[Alt the local level, a
certain dysfunction sets in because land use decision makers are elected, or are appointed by
elected officials. As a result, those who live next to proposed developments . . . have influence
and power because they are constituents of the decision-makers and they resist change.").
56 See Davidson, supra note 49, at 1024; Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 55, at 6 (noting
that existing land use control mechanisms are inadequate to deal with LULU siting).
" Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption in EnvironmentalLaw: Formalism, FederalismTheory,
and Default Rules, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES' POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 166,
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To that end, federal regulation that preempts or constrains the siting process
creates the legal mechanism necessary to compel local governments to
weigh national interests against local concerns in siting decisions.ss
2.

Federal Subsidization of Protected Land Use

Federal preemption that eliminates or reduces the ability of local authorities to bargain over zoning restrictions provides a significant political
and economic benefit to the land use developer, thereby subsidizing the protected land use.59 In many localities, land use developers must negotiate with
the local community to secure homeowner approval.60 Federal preemption of
local zoning requirements dramatically alters the dynamic between community and developer:
Removing a zoning restriction from a piece of land ordinarily provides a financial benefit to the property owner. Every developer
knows that securing the consent of local officials to a project with
hostile neighbors is an arduous, expensive process that often requires community compensation, reductions in project size, and
changes in design.6'
In addition, where federal preemption serves to override concerns regarding facilities siting, it forces the local community to absorb the "psychic
costs" of the land use.6 2 In other words, if developers do not internalize the
negative externalities of siting undesirable land uses, then the neighbors are,
in effect, subsidizing the use. 63 Since federal preemption provides a significant subsidy for the targeted land use and interferes with a deeply local function, the decision to preempt and the degree of preemption must be carefully
considered. The next Part provides context for this consideration by situating
federal preemption of local land use authority within the broader preemption
debate.
175-76 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007); see also Robert L. Glicksman &
Richard E. Leyy, A Collective Action Perspectiveon Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 579, 608 (2008)
(arguing that ceiling preemption is a proper response to NIMBYism).
" See infra notes 100-103 (describing the use of federal regulation in the environmental
context to force state and local actors to internalize the costs of their decisions).
" See Gerrard,supra note 17, at 1108; Serkin, supra note 9, at 1652.
' Serkin, supra note 9, at 1652 ("Whether through bribes or extortion-exactions or
threats to leave-special interest groups must still secure local homeowner approval or they
will not find a responsive local government.").
6 Gerrard, supra note 17, at 1108.
62 Robert A. Bohrer, Fear and Trembling in the Twentieth Century: Technological Risk,
Uncertainty and Emotional Distress, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 83, 111 (1984) (noting that denial of
damages for emotional distress related to facilities siting represents a deliberate choice to subsidize the facility rather than require the developer to internalize the "psychic costs" of the
facility).
6 Gerrard, supra note 17, at 1109 (describing economic subsidy in the context of hazardous waste facilities siting).
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PERSPECTIVES ON PREEMPTION IN LAND USE

So long as it is regulating within the scope of its constitutionally enumerated powers, Congress has broad authority under the Supremacy Clause
to preempt state and local laws." In a number of substantive areas, Congress
has emphatically asserted its authority to enact uniform national policies and
regulations. For example, federal civil rights statutes prohibit discrimination
in employment and housing and broadly preempt less protective state and
local laws.65 The Fair Labor Standards Act 6 6 establishes a national minimum
wage, preempting state laws that set a lower minimum wage or that have no
minimum wage at all. 67 Similarly, the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act ("ERISA")61 establishes national standards for most pension and health
plans in private industry and entirely preempts similar state laws. 69
As the Supreme Court's federalism opinions emphasize, however, there
are a number of compelling normative reasons for Congress to wield its
preemptive power cautiously. In the words of the Court, federalism:
assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to
the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; it allows for
more innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes
government more responsive by putting the States in competition
for a mobile citizenry.70
Thus, the underlying policy choice in preemption involves weighing the
advantages of uniformity against the benefits of decentralization. 71 In many
substantive areas, Congress seeks to split the difference, adopting what have

' Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,
203 (1983) ("It is well established that within constitutional limits Congress may pre-empt
state authority by so stating in express terms.").
65 See, e.g., Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006); Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101
(2006).
66 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006).
See id. § 206 (2006 & Supp. I 2007).
6
"Id. §§ 1001-1461 (2006).
69 See id.; cf Eleanor D. Kinney, Clearing the Way for an Effective Federal-StatePartnership in Health Reform, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 899, 935-36 (1999) (criticizing the broad
preemptive scope of ERISA, and suggesting it be replaced with a more flexible framework that
allows for state experimentation).
70 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1991) (internal citation omitted); see also
Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term-Foreword: Federalism All the Way
Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 (2010) (noting that federalism "promotes choice, competition,
participation, experimentation and the diffusion of power"); Ryan, supra note 7, at 601-02
(identifying values underlying a federal system of government).
' Davidson, supra note 49, at 1006-07 & n.206; Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political
Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 856 (1998).
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been variously termed "interactive,"7 2 "dynamic,"" "iterative,"7 4 "diagonal," 7 or most generically, "cooperative"76 regimes that engage multiple,
overlapping levels of government to promote diversity within a federalist
framework.
Typically, cooperative federalist statutes outline the contours of a regulatory program, encouraging states to implement the program in accordance
with federal guidelines.7 1 Such programs involve varying combinations of
preemption, collaboration, and fiscal incentives to involve state governments
in the regulatory process. 9 For example, cooperative federalist statutes often
include both carrots and sticks: the promise of federal financial assistance
for states that comply, and the threat of more intrusive federal preemption
should states fail to do so.8 0 Within the cooperative federalist framework,
states are authorized to experiment with implementation techniques and tailor their individual programs to accommodate local conditions and preferences.81 Cooperative federalism thus seeks a functional compromise between
federal preemption and federal delegation, preserving the primacy of the fed72

E.g., Schapiro, supra note 2; William W. Buzbee, Interaction's Promise: Preemption

Policy Shifts, Risk Regulation, and Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY L.J. 145, 146 (2007)

(noting that Congress and agencies prefer regulatory overlap and interaction, "harnessing the
strengths of state and federal institutional actors and forcing the two to interact").
73 E.g., Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalismin Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159 passim (2006).
74 Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalismand Climate Change, 103 Nw. U.L. REV. 1097
passim (2009).
7 Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change "International"?Litigation'sDiagonal Regulatory

Role, 49 VA. J. Iwr L. 585, 642 (2009).
76 Weiser, supra note 42, at 1696; Dwyer, supra note 42, at 1197-99; Davidson, supra
note 49, at 967-68.
n Davidson, supra note 49, at 967-68 (noting that cooperative federalism balances uniformity and diversity); Weiser, supra note 42, at 1695 (noting that in enacting cooperative
federalism regimes "Congress opts for the benefits of diversity in regulatory policy within a
federal framework").
7 See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 153 1(c)(2) (2006); Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7402(a) (2006); see also
Jonathan H. Adler, JudicialFederalismand the Future of EnvironmentalRegulation, 90 IoWA

L. REV. 377, 384-87 & n.35 (2005) (discussing cooperative federalism schemes); Dwyer,
supra note 42, at 1197-99 (describing cooperative federalism under the Clean Air Act);
Weiser, supra note 42, at 1698 (describing cooperative federalism programs that permit state
variances from minimum federal standards or encourage state discretion in implementation).
79 Adler, supra note 78, at 384 (describing use of financial assistance to induce states to
participate in cooperative schemes); Davidson, supra note 49, at 966-67 & n.15 (describing
range of federal-state regulatory options, including preemption, collaboration, and absence of
federal involvement).
a As Professor Adler explains:
State programs that meet federal standards are typically eligible for federal financial
assistance. States that fail to adopt adequate programs are not only denied the relevant federal funding, they can also be subject to various sanctions and federal preemption of their programs. That is, if states refuse to regulate in accordance with
federal guidelines, the federal government may regulate in their place.
Adler, supra note 78, at 384.
1 Id.; Weiser, supra note 42, 1697-98 & n.23 (noting that federal programs promote diversity in order to allow states to tailor federal policies to local conditions).
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eral government to set national priorities and standards without sacrificing
the benefits of diversity achieved through decentralization. 8 2
A.

The Benefits of Decentralization in Land Use Law

Decentralization allows states to tailor regulatory responses to accommodate varying geographic and economic conditions and community preferences.83 The ability to tailor regulation to local conditions is vitally important
for land use because the substantive content of "good" land use law varies
by locale:
[T]he legal framework of rules, policies, and incentives to influence "good" land use practices is informed by the geographical
context of the physical and socioeconomic systems in which land
use operates. In other words, the effectiveness and validity of legal
measures to control harmful externalities depend upon [an] understanding of the geographical context in which such effects arise.M
Thus, the "reasonableness" of a particular zoning decision depends
upon the desired city form and social make up of the area.s Given the tremendous diversity between, and even within local jurisdictions, federal preemption that creates uniform land use standards may result in policies that fit
poorly with local conditions. 6
In addition, citizen participation in policymaking, which is presumably
easier at the state and local levels,8 7 facilitates local tailoring by increasing
governmental responsiveness to the needs and preferences of the local community. In other words, "the smaller the polity in geography and in population, the easier it is for the people (1) to monitor what their government is
doing, (2) to criticize or praise, and therefore (3) to affect public policy." 8
82 Davidson, supra note 49, at 967-68.
83 Id. at 1006-07; see also Benjamin K.

Sovacool, The Best of Both Worlds: Environmental Federalismand the Need for FederalAction on Renewable Energy and Climate Change, 27
STAN. ENvTL. L. J. 397, 432 (2008).
* RUTHERFORD H. PLATr, LAND USE AND SocIETY: GEOGRAPHY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLIcy 419 (rev. ed. 2004) (emphasis removed).
" Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 55, at 10 (further noting that there are no "transcendent zoning values" that apply to all land use decisions).
86 Karol Ceplo & Bruce Yandle, Western States and EnvironmentalFederalism:An Examination of Institutional Viability, in ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 225, 225-26 (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1997) ("There is recognition that homogenous solutions applied to
heterogeneous problems often yield high costs and weak results."); Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 130, 136-37 (2005)
("The failure to take into account local environmental conditions-let alone local tastes, preferences, and economic conditions-leads to 'one size fits all' policies that fit few areas well, if
at all.").
8 See Davidson, supra note 49, at 1008; Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93
HARv. L. REV. 1057, 1069 (1980) (noting that limited size is required for individual participation in political life).
" Hamilton, supra note 41, at 321.
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In contrast, both Congress, which enacts preemption statutes, and the federal
courts, which interpret such statutes, "are remote from average citizens and
lack effective, low-cost channels through which citizens can communicate
and implement their views." 9
Moreover, novel state and local environmental and land use laws often
serve as a catalyst for further government action, encouraging regulation in
areas that otherwise would not be addressed.90 For example, California famously adopted standards governing automobile emissions, leading to the
adoption of a federal vehicles emissions standard.9' New York similarly has
been credited with initiating a states-wide trend in offering tax incentives for
environmentally conscious "green building." 92 More recently, state and local
initiatives in the area of climate change have prompted the federal government to consider federal climate change regulations,93 as well as a national
renewable portfolio standard. 94
'9 S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L.
REV. 685, 695 (1991).
* See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 19-22 (2007) (describing key role of state
and local politicians as "natural policy entrepreneurs who can significantly influence what
sorts of conditions are publicly recognized as problems"); Kirsten Engel, State and Local
Climate Change Initiatives: What Is Motivating State and Local Governments to Address a
Global Problem and What Does This Say About Federalismand EnvironmentalLaw?, 38 URB.
LAw. 1015, 1026 (2006) (noting that "[e]nvironmental law is replete with examples where
state regulatory initiatives on a given issue have succeeded in prompting a federal regulatory
response.").
91 Jonathan H. Adler, The Fable of FederalEnvironmental Regulation: Reconsidering the
Federal Role in Environmental Protection, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 93, 102-03 (2004);
Ryan, supra note 7, at 617.
92 Darren A. Prum, Creating State Incentives for Commercial Green Buildings: Did the
Nevada Experience Set an Example or Alter the Approach of Other Jurisdictions?,34 Wm. &
MARY ENvTh. L. & PoL'Y REV. 171, 190 (2009) ("Many people credit New York with pioneering the use of government incentives to entice developers into sustainable buildings.");
Green Buildings, N.Y. DEPT OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/218.
html (last visited Mar. 22, 2011) (noting that New York's innovative tax incentive program has
become a model for other states and communities); see also Andrew Meyerson, The Dollars
and Cents of Green Construction,J. ACCOUNTANCY, May 2005, at 47, 50 (appending a chart of
the thirty-five states that offer a combination of income, corporate, property, or sales tax incentives to green building projects).
93 See Matthew L. Wald, E.P.A. Moving on Greenhouse Gases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24,
2010, at A16 (describing EPA's proposed regulation of greenhouse gas emissions despite opposition in Congress); J. Kevin Healy & Jeffrey M. Tapick, Climate Change: It's Not Just a
Policy Issue for Corporate Counsel-It's a Legal Problem, 29 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 89,
98-100 (2004) (noting state initiatives on climate change include urging the federal govern-

ment to address the issue); cf Engel, supra note 90, at 1026 (noting that "the long-term significance of state and local action on climate change may lie in its impact in triggering action at
higher levels of government, such as at the national level or even within the international
arena").
' Renewable Portfolio Standards ("RPS") have been adopted in many states to require
public utilities to generate increasing percentages of electricity from renewable sources.
Bronin, supra note 24, at 577; see also Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward:The Argument for
a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REv. 1339, 1341 (2010) (noting that over twenty-five proposals
for a national RPS have been introduced in the federal legislature); Salkin & Ostrow, supra
note 53, at 1050-51 (describing proposed federal renewable portfolio standard).
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Decentralization thus enables states to serve as "laboratories of democracy." 95 In contrast, federal preemption prevents states from experimenting
with novel social and economic strategies.9 6 Moreover, preemptive federal
standards can lock in suboptimal regulatory choices by eliminating the incentives and ability of sub-national actors to seek change. Along these lines,
William Buzbee has argued:
With complete displacement, especially if common law venues are
preempted, no actor or institution outside the federal regulatory
venue has any room or incentive to criticize and seek change.
Change will likely occur only if the preempting federal actor-be
it an administrative agency or the legislature--decides to change
its previous decision. 97
Instead, better regulatory policy may be achieved if local regulators are
given the flexibility and discretion to experiment with a variety of standards
before a single national standard is selected. 98
B.

The Benefits of National Uniformity in Land Use Law

Despite the many benefits of decentralization, for some land use
problems, national uniformity through preemptive federal statutes is desirable. As Steven G. Calabresi observes, "[s]ometimes variety is not the spice
of life; as to some items it may be a downright nuisance and an expensive
one at that. National government eliminates these potential deadweight social costs with general gains in social utility as a result." 99
For example, a federal approach might be necessary to address a problem that crosses state boundaries. The most commonly cited example is environmental regulation, where, the argument goes, individual states have
little incentive to consider the effects of their environmental policies on
other states:
Consider a factory that dumps pollution in a rural Illinois river,
making the river downstream, next to a populous Missouri town,

9 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,

285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);

see also Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratoriesof Democracy? Policy Innovation in Decentralized Government, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1339 (2009) (assessing the extent to which

local governments experiment with social and legal policy).
' Buzbee, supra note 72, passim (using experimentalist scholarship to illuminate the risk
of an aggressive approach to preemption). See generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel,
A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267 (1998).

" Buzbee, supra note 72, at 157.
98 Weiser, supra note 42, at 1702; cf Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Ar-

bitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 461, 545 (2003)

(describing, as a possible objection to agency rulemaking, that it "requires agencies to set
achievable levels of compliance based on speculation when they more fruitfully might experiment with proposed levels").
* Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense

of United States v. Lopez, 94

MICH.

L. REv. 752, 780 (1995).
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unswimmable and undrinkable. The upstream state government
may not have a strong incentive to take into account the harm to
downstream out-of-state residents-a "negative externality" from
an in-state activity that generates jobs and tax revenues.'"
Some argue that addressing environmental spillovers in a decentralized
0 In cases of substantial interstate spillovers,
system is virtually impossible.o'
only the federal government is able to compel states to absorb the costs of
their activities.102 Along these lines, Thomas Merrill has argued that state
laws should be presumptively preempted when a state is attempting to export
a disproportionate share of the cost of environmental regulation to other
states. 103
Similarly, the federal government, which is removed from local politics
and NIMBY sentiment, may be in the best position to distribute the burdens
of certain locally undesirable land uses across the nation. In his seminal
work on hazardous waste facilities siting, Michael Gerrard emphasized the
potential for the federal government to fairly allocate the burdens of waste
disposal amongst the fifty states based upon the amount of waste they generate, their existing disposal capacity, and their geographic characteristics.'0
In contrast, state governments, perhaps because they are more responsive to local constituents, are less likely to adopt aggressive redistributive
programs.o'0 Further devolving power to local governments seems to exacerbate the effect. As Richard Briffault has noted, "[c]ontemporary cities, as a
rule, do not engage in innovative redistributive programs, not because they
lack the legal authority, but rather because they fear that initiating such programs would cause residential and commercial taxpayers to depart."l06 Thus,
"oVerchick & Mendelson, supra note 2, at 18; see also Glicksman & Levy, supra note
57, at 593 (arguing that federal environmental regulation is most justified when collective
action problems create incentives for states acting individually to regulate in ways that are
contrary to the interests of the states as a collective).
101See, e.g., Christina C. Caplan, The Failure of Current Legal and Regulatory Mechanisms to Control Interstate Ozone Transport: The Need for New National Legislation, 28
ECOLOGY

L.Q. 169, 201-02 (2001) (arguing that decentralization cannot address interstate

spillovers); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MiCH. L. REv. 570,

624 (1996) ("[W]hen problems are transboundary in scope . . . decentralized enforcement
breaks down entirely.").
.02
See Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is

It "To the Bottom"?, 48 HAsTINGs L.J. 271 (1997) (arguing that without federal regulation,
states would engage in a "race to the bottom" by relaxing environmental standards to attract
industry, contrary to the national interest); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Regulation, Deregulation,
Federalism, and Administrative Law: Agency Power to Preempt State Regulation, 46 U. Prrr.

L. REv. 607, 670 (1985) (arguing that states should not be permitted to make regulatory decisions that create substantial interstate spillovers).
03 Merrill, supra note 57, at 175.
'" Gerrard, supra note 17, at 1205-06.
'os See Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: Accountingfor the Tyranny ofState Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 552, 594-95 (1999) (observing that

the national government has historically been far more interventionist on behalf of both the
poor and racial minorities than have state governments).
'" Briffault, supra note 9, at 408; see also Cashin, supra note 105, at 594-95.
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the federal government is often in the best position to make fundamental
policy choices about redistribution.107
In addition, where a national market truly exists, the presence of state
regulations that differ substantially from federal requirements and from each
other hinders interstate commerce and the growth of the regulated industry. 0 Uniformity helps industry and investors by providing a more "consis-

tent and predictable statutory environment."'0 In fact, federal preemption
statutes are often enacted in response to industry lobbying seeking to displace an array of inconsistent regulatory requirements with a uniform federal
standard. 10
In the land use context, local permitting processes create an array of
inconsistent regulations that can impede the growth of national industries.
Consider, for example, the Telecommunications Siting Policy, explored in
greater detail in Part IV. In its report on the telecommunications law, the
House Commerce Committee explained that diverse state and local siting
requirements hindered the development of a national telecommunications
network.'' According to the report:
[C]urrent State and local requirements, siting and zoning decisions by non-federal units of government, have created an inconsistent and, at times, conflicting patchwork of requirements which
will inhibit the deployment of Personal Communications Services
(PCS) . .. The Committee believes it is in the national interest that

uniform, consistent requirements, with adequate safeguards of the
public health and safety, be established as soon as possible." 2
The Telecommunications Siting Policy was thus established to increase regulatory consistency and predictability for telecommunications service providers so as to facilitate the growth of a national telecommunications network.

107Cashin, supra note 105, at 556 (noting that "voters show more willingness to accept
redistributive spending at the national level"); see also PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMrTs 82-83
(1981) (supporting federal involvement in redistributive programs to improve equity).

"'sAnn E. Carlson, Energy Efficiency and Federalism, 107

MICH.

L. REV.

FIRST IMPRES-

63, 67 (2008) (noting that "[elven proponents of a strong state role in environmental
policymaking advocate federal preemption for the regulation of products for which there is a
national market, such as appliances"); Weiser, supra note 42, at 1710-11 (highlighting the
benefits of uniformity where a national market exists, as in the case of e-signatures).
sIONs

'" Esty, supra note 101, at 619; see also Sovacool, supra note 83, at 421-22.

1o Engel, supra note 73, at 184-85; see also Hills, supra note 90, at 29-30 (noting that
industry interest groups will often favor regulatory uniformity even when that uniformity results in more stringent controls); Hoke, supra note 89, at 691-92 & n.27 (describing industry
preference for federal preemption); Pietro S. Nivola, Does Federalism Have a Future?, 142
PUB. INT., Winter 2001, at 44, 55 (noting that the federal motor-vehicle safety and emissions
standards were enacted after "[t]he automobile industry lobbied to preempt the states from
setting disparate standards, some of which might be overly militant.").
" H.R. REP. No. 104-204, pt. 1, at 94 (1995), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 61.
112Id.
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FEDERAL SITING REGIMES

Notwithstanding the historically local nature of land use law, the federal government has long played a role in shaping local development." 3
Since the 1970s the federal government has been the primary regulator of
environmental issues, with a significant impact on local land use policies.Il 4
In addition, federal housing acts have long required local communities to
engage in some form of land use planning as a condition to the receipt of
federal housing and community development funds."' Federal funding for
urban housing and renewal programs has directly influenced the growth and
development of urban areas."' Federal transportation policies have facilitated suburbanization (and urban sprawl),' while the federal mortgage interest deduction and property tax deductions for owner-occupied housing
impacts local housing patterns and development."' Federal agricultural policies promote land conservation by local authorities," 9 and in many regions
of the country, local land use policies are impacted by federal land holdings.120 In the civil rights context, federal laws including the Americans with

'" See, e.g., Green, supra note 29, at 70-71; Robert I. McMurry, Using FederalLaws and
Regulations to Control Local Land Use, A.L.I.-A.B.A. LAND USE INST. 357 (2001); Salkin,
supra note 26, at 383-87.
114 See, e.g., Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (2006) (providing
funds, policy guidance, and technical assistance to coastal state governments to help them
establish and maintain coastal zone management programs that meet federal standards); Clean

Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2006) (establishing national pollution standards and permitting requirements); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721-23 (2006) (discussing the
federal wetland permitting process for local development).
"' Peter Salsich, Jr., Toward A Policy Of Heterogeneity: Overcoming A Long History Of
Socioeconomic Segregation In Housing, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 459, 487 (2007).
"6 Scott L. Cummings & Benjamin S. Beach, The Federal Role in Community Economic
Development, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 89, 91-92 (2006); Green, supra note 29, at 88-98; see
also Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and Its Crit-

ics, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 560-96 (2005) (discussing the impact of current federal attempts
to increase economic investment in low- and middle-income communities).
" Davidson, supra note 49, at 968 n.21; Green, supra note 29, at 81-84; U.S. GEN.
GAO/RCED-99-87, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: EXTENT OF FEDERAL
INFLUENCE ON "URBAN SPRAWL" IS UNCLEAR 2-4 (1999) (recognizing the federal role in
patterns of local development).
"1 See Davidson, supra note 49, at 968 n.21; Green, supra note 29, at 84-87.
See, e.g., Sodbuster Law, 16 U.S.C. § 3811 (2006) (requiring the implementation of
conservation plans for certain land); Conservation Reserve Program, 16 U.S.C. §§ 590a, 3831
(1994) (authorizing contracts with eligible owners and operators of highly erodible cropland to
assist in conserving and improving their soil and water resources); see also Green, supra note
29, at 99-102 (describing impact of federal agricultural policies on local land use).
120 See, e.g., Sandra K. Davis, Fighting over Public Lands: Interest Groups, States, and
the Federal Government, in WESTERN PUBLIC LANDS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 11, 25
(Charles Davis ed., 1997) (discussing conflicts between county governments and federal agencies over public land policy); Robert D. Comer, Cooperative Conservation: The Federalism
Underpinnings to Public Involvement in the Management of Public Lands, 75 U. COLo. L.
REV. 1133, 1133 (2004) (discussing efforts to include local entities in federal land management decisions).
ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
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Disabilities Act ("ADA")12 ' and the Fair Housing Act establish baseline
standards of equality that constrain local zoning authority.122
This Part examines several federal regulatory regimes aimed at siting
nationally relevant facilities.12 3 Section A analyzes the federal approach to
siting radioactive waste disposal facilities. Federal siting regimes have run
the gamut from aggressive unitary preemption, in the case of high-level
waste, to complete delegation to state authority, in the case of low-level
waste. Both regimes, however, have dramatically failed to achieve national
land use goals.
Section B examines the "Process Preemption" siting regime established by the Telecommunications Siting Policy. The Telecommunications
Siting Policy leaves primary siting authority in the hands of local regulators,
but places explicit substantive and procedural constraints on the decisionmaking process.124 Though litigation continues regarding the interpretation
of the Act,'25 the Telecommunications Siting Policy has succeeded in facilitating cell phone tower siting, enabling the rapid deployment of a national
telecommunications network.126

U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
See, e.g., Oconomowoc Residential Programs, Inc. v. Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775,
781-83 (7th Cir. 2002) (requiring municipality to grant zoning variance to accommodate
group homes for the disabled); Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 44
(2d Cir. 1997) (concluding that the ADA prohibits municipalities from discriminating against
individuals on the basis of their disability when enacting and implementing zoning ordinances); see also supra notes 47-48.
123 Another federal siting regime not explored in this Article is that established by the
siting provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified
at 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 15801-16524 (2006) and scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 16 U.S.C.
(2006)), which grants the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission exclusive siting authority
for liquid natural gas terminals and some electric transmission corridors, 15 U.S.C. § 717b
(2006). See, e.g., Joshua P. Fershee, Misguided Energy: Why Recent Legislative, Regulatory,
and Market Initiatives are Insufficient to Improve the U.S. Energy Infrastructure,44 HARV. J.
ON LEGIs. 327 (2007) (discussing the effects of the Energy Policy Act of 2005).
124 The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to
2000cc-5 (2006) ("RLUIPA"), which requires courts to strictly scrutinize local land use decisions that substantially burden religious exercise, is arguably another, more blunt, example of
Process Preemption. However, RLUIPA is a civil rights statute whose purpose differs significantly from the regulatory regimes analyzed in this Article. Thus, a full analysis of RLUIPA
through the framework of Process Preemption will be saved for the future. For an overview of
RLUIPA, see generally Adam J. Macleod, A Non-Fatal Collision: InterpretingRLUIPA Where
Religious Land Uses and Community Interests Meet, 42 URB. LAW. 41 (2010); Ostrow, supra
note 29.
125 See Robert B. Foster, What the Meaning of "May" May Be: Recent Developments in
JudicialReview of Land Use Regulation of Cellular Telecommunications Facilities Under the
TelecommunicationsAct of 1996, 41 URB. LAW. 501, 503-12 (2009) (summarizing recent litigation over the Telecommunications Siting Policy); Susan Lorde Martin, Wind Farms and
NIMBYs: Generating Conflict, Reducing Litigation,20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REv. 427, 433-35
(2010) (describing ongoing litigation).
126 See supra notes 21-22.
121 42
122
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Preemption and Delegation in Radioactive Waste Facilities Siting

During the 1950s and 1960s, waste disposal facilities were sited in the
same way as other forms of heavy industry. Companies considered a variety
of factors, including proximity to markets and materials; availability of labor, transportation, utilities and infrastructure; and land and development
costs.' 27 With little governmental oversight and little concern for environmental or geological factors, disposal facilities tended to be built close to
industrial operations, often in or near cities, or else on wetlands and floodplains, where land was less expensive.'28
In the 1970s, however, increased public awareness of the health and
safety risks posed by radioactive waste led to intense public opposition to
the siting of disposal facilities.12 9 In response, the federal government
adopted two diametrically opposed strategies for siting radioactive waste facilities: complete preemption of state and local control for siting high-level
waste facilities, and complete delegation to the states for siting low-level
waste facilities. Despite their differences, both approaches have failed to
overcome local opposition to these land uses.
1.

Unitary Preemption and High-Level Radioactive Waste

For national security reasons, the federal government has long asserted
exclusive authority to manage high-level radioactive waste.13 0 The Atomic
Energy Act of 1954'1' and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974132 granted
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") exclusive regulatory authority over high-level nuclear waste facilities.' 33 The statutes left no room for
state participation, other than in an advisory capacity for certain transportation issues. 13 4 Nonetheless, by the late 1970s, the states began to actively
regulate, restrict, and even ban the shipment of highly toxic nuclear waste
and the establishment of radioactive waste facilities within their borders.'33
To resolve the jurisdictional conflict, Congress enacted the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act of 1982 ("NWPA").' 6 The Act was intended to "establish
a schedule for the siting, construction, and operation of repositories" to protect the public and the environment "from the hazards posed by high-level
127
128

Gerrard, supra note 17, at 1091.
Id.

129 Id. at

1138.

Id. at 1165-66 ("For obvious reasons of national security, federal primacy in the disposal of radioactive waste is well established.").
1' 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2297h-13 (2006).
132 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (2006).
'1342 U.S.C § 2011; 42 U.S.C. § 5801; see also Kearney, supra note 8, at 59 (noting that
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 organized federal-state relations in a hierarchical "layer-cake"
model, in which the federal government regulated all phases of the nuclear fuel cycle).
'3 Kearney & Garey, supra note 16, at 18.
130

135 Id.

13642

U.S.C. §§ 10101-10270 (2006).
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radioactive waste." 37 The NWPA required the Secretary of Energy to nominate five sites for a high-level radioactive waste repository and to recommend three of them to the President for further study by January 1, 1985.138
The Act further required the Secretary of Energy to develop guidelines by
which to evaluate potential repository sites.'3 9
The NWPA also allowed any designated state to veto its selection, subject to an override by a majority vote of both houses of Congress.140 Not
surprisingly, little progress was made in selecting a site, as each Department
of Energy ("DOE") proposal was strenuously opposed by state and local
officials.141 In 1987, Congress amended the NWPA and expressly designated
Yucca Mountain, federally owned land in Nevada, as the single national disposal site for all high-level radioactive waste.142 Though Congress formally
approved the location in 2002, the opening of the site was continuously
delayed by public opposition, legal challenges, and environmental studies.143
In 2009, more than two decades after the NWPA was enacted and billions of dollars spent studying and constructing the facility, the DOE announced that the Yucca Mountain site was no longer a viable option for
storing high-level waste.144 In early 2010, the DOE formally initiated a termination action by filing a motion with the NRC seeking to withdraw its
Yucca Mountain license application.145 In response, South Carolina, concerned that it would become a primary target for a new high-level radioactive waste site, filed suit to enjoin the DOE from abandoning the Yucca
Mountain site.146 A panel of administrative law judges at the NRC ruled that
the NWPA prevents the DOE from terminating its license application.147
37

1

138

'

39

Id. § 10131(b).
Id. § 10132(b).
Id. § 10132(a).

1"Id.

§ 10135(c).

"' Kearney, supra note 8, at 59 (noting that "political gridlock quickly ensued as vehe-

mently opposed state officials and citizens rejected various DOE proposals").
142 42 U.S.C. § 10101; Kearney, supra note 8, at 60.
143 Adams, supra note 12, at 432, 438 (describing delays caused by scientific and environmental studies and judicial and administrative challenges); Kearney, supra note 8, at 60
(describing contentious siting process at Yucca Mountain).
'" See supra note 13; see also Motion to Withdraw of U.S. Dept. of Energy at I & n.2,
U.S. Dep't of Energy (High-Level Waste Repository), No. 63-001, 2010 NRC LEXIS 14 (Mar.
3, 2010), available at http://www.energy.gov/news/documents/DOEMotion-to Withdraw.
pdf (noting that the DOE's decision to terminate the Yucca Mountain project was announced in
its 2011 budget request); Editorial, Nuclear Wasteland: The U.S. Still Needs a Long-Term
Solution, WASH. PosT, June 14, 2010, at A16 (describing termination of Yucca Mountain
project).
"I Motion to Withdraw of U.S. Dep't of Energy, supra note 144, at 1.
146 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, South Carolina v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, No. 10-1229,
2010 WL 978771, at *6 (4th Cir. Feb. 26, 2010) (South Carolina complains that "[t]he abandonment of the Yucca Mountain site would place South Carolina back on the list of candidate
states for a high-level nuclear waste or spent fuel storage or disposal facility of some kind.").
147 Matthew L. Wald, Administration Cannot Drop Bid for Nuclear Waste Dump in Nevada, Panel Finds, N.Y. TOmEs, June 30, 2010, at A19. The NWPA requires the NRC to complete its review of the DOE application in three years. See GAO NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note
12, at 7.
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In the meantime, nuclear waste continues to be stored where it is generated, at over eighty commercial and DOE nuclear facilities located in thirtyfive states.148 Facility managers must actively manage the nuclear waste by
continually isolating, confining, and monitoring it to keep humans and the
environment safe. 149
In conjunction with the termination of Yucca Mountain, President
Obama established a Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future
that is charged with conducting a comprehensive review of policies for managing the disposal of high-level waste.5 0 Despite the ongoing work of the
Blue Ribbon Commission, the United States is no closer to siting a highlevel radioactive waste repository than it was before the NWPA was enacted
over twenty years ago. Yet the need for a viable solution is even more pressing now as the DOE's renewed interest in nuclear power as an alternative to
fossil fuel'"' and the ongoing nuclear crisis in Japan 52 promise to thrust the
siting of nuclear facilities into the national spotlight once again.
2.

State Autonomy and Low-Level Radioactive Waste

In contrast to Congress's preemptive approach to high-level waste siting, Congress expressly delegated siting authority for low-level waste disposal facilities to the states. The LLW Act of 1980 and the 1985 Amendments
represented a significant break from the prior scheme, in which the federal
government asserted exclusive authority over radioactive waste management.'15 The new policy was hailed for devolving power to the states, freeing
the national government from the day-to-day responsibility of LLW management, and granting states the power to exercise their constitutional authority
over land use regulation and the protection of public health and safety.15 4

148 GAO

NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 12, at 1.

14 Id.at 8.
50
DEPr OF ENERGY, BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AMERICA'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, ADVISORY

COMMITEE CHARTER (Mar. 1, 2010), available at http://www.energy.gov/news/documents/
BRCCharter.pdf; Motion to Withdraw of U.S. Dep't of Energy, supra note 144, at 1-2 (terminating Yucca Mountain project and confirming establishment of Blue Ribbon Commission).
'"' Matthew L. Wald, A Comeback for Nuclear Power? After a 30 Year Hiatus, Nuclear
Energy in the U.S. May Be Getting Another Chance, N.Y. TIMES UPFRONT, May 10, 2010, at
14 (describing the Obama administration's interest in promoting the development of "a new
generation of safe, clean nuclear power plants"). But cf Bob Herbert, Op-Ed, We're Not
Ready, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2010, at A23 (cautioning against development of nuclear power).
152 On March I1, 2011, Japan suffered a devastating earthquake and tsunami, triggering a
nuclear crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. See, e.g., William J. Broad &
David Jolly, U.N.'s Nuclear Chief Says Japan Is 'Far From the End of the Accident,' N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2011, at A14; Eric Lichtblau, Lobbyists' Long Effort to Revive NuclearIndustry Faces New Test, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 25, 2011, at Al; Hiroko Tabuchi & Ken Belson, Contaminated Water Leaks Are Reported at Nuclear Plant, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 29, 2011, at A 12.
'. Richard C. Kearney & John J. Stucker, Interstate Compacts and the Management of
Low-Level Radioactive Wastes, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 210, 216-18 (1985).
'" Id. at 210.
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Despite this early optimism, the LLW policy has also failed in its goal of
siting additional LLW disposal facilities.
a.

The National Low-Level Waste Disposal Crisis

Between 1962 and 1971, six commercial low-level radioactive waste
facilities were opened in the United States with little public awareness or
opposition.' 5 Between 1975 and 1978, three of these sites were permanently
closed, either because they were full or due to environmental contamination.116 As the public became increasingly aware of the health and environmental risks posed by hazardous waste facilities, public opposition to
facilities' siting grew. 151 As a result, local communities began relying on the
land use regulatory process to prevent the siting of such undesirable land
uses.'s
In 1979, two of the remaining three LLW facilities-Richland, Washington and Beatty, Nevada-were forced to shut down temporarily in response to reports of improper handling of LLW.159 The closures left
Barnwell, South Carolina as the only operating LLW facility in the country.'" The governor of South Carolina, fearing that his state would have to
take on the entire nation's low-level radioactive waste, ordered a fifty percent reduction in the quantity of waste accepted at the Barnwell site.161 Feeling similarly overburdened, the governors of Washington and Nevada soon
threatened to shut their sites permanently.1 62
The governors of all three host states testified before Congress, proposing a national LLW policy that would require states to manage the disposal
of their own waste and encourage states to form interstate compacts to fulfill
their responsibilities.163 The governors' view, later endorsed by the National

.ss
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 150 (1994) (listing sites at Beatty, Nevada
(1962), Maxey Flats, Kentucky (1963), West Valley, New York (1963), Hanford, Washington
(1965), Sheffield, Illinois (1967), and Barnwell, South Carolina (1971)); see also Daniel
Tarlock, Benjamin Davy's Essential Injustice: A Comparative and Philosophical Analysis of
the LULU Siting Mess, 22 HARV. ENvrL. L. REV. 607, 612 (1998) ("Until the 1980s, the
location of a hazardous waste or nuclear facility was simply another exercise of local land use
authority; host communities paid little attention to the issue, and even welcomed power plants
and dumps.").
156New York, 505 U.S. at 150; Barry G. Rabe et al., NIMBY and Maybe: Conflict and
Cooperation in the Siting of Low Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities in the United
States and Canada, 24 ENVTL. L. 68, 75 (1994) (describing closure of Maxey Flats and West
Valley disposal sites due to leaking radioactive materials).
157 Gerrard, supra note 17, at 1052; Rabe et al., supra note 156, at 76; Tarlock, supra note
155, at 610-14 (describing the rise of local opposition to facilities siting).
'" Deborah M. Mostaghel, The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act: An
Overview, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 379, 382-85 (1994); Tarlock, supra note 155, at 612.
' New York, 505 U.S. at 150.
6Id.
Id.

161

162 Id.; Kearney, supra note 8, at 60 (noting that "the governors of the three remaining
LLW host states met in 1979 and agreed that the burden had become onerous").
6 Kearney, supra note 8, at 60.
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Governors' Association ("NGA"),'" treated LLW disposal as a land use issue, traditionally within the scope of state and local authority, rather than a
national security issue, properly within the purview of the federal

government. 165
Congress adopted these suggestions in the LLW Act, which declared a
federal policy of holding each state responsible for disposing of its own
LLW and authorized states to enter into regional waste disposal compacts.166
The LLW Act required each compact region to develop a siting plan containing "detailed procedures and a schedule for establishing a facility location
and preparing a facility license application."' 67 Under the Act, the sited
states would be authorized to refuse to accept waste generated outside of
their regional compacts beginning in 1986.168 At the time, the state-based
approach "received bipartisan support in Congress and among the nation's
governors, and was hailed as a unique example of congressional responsiveness to the desires of the states."' 69 Commentators believed that the LLW
Act would succeed because the states, now exclusively responsible for siting
the facilities, had strongly supported the legislation.o70
b.

Incentives for Compliance: Carrots and Sticks

Despite their support for the legislation, states remained reluctant to site
waste facilities within their own borders.' 7' Moreover, the LLW Act did not
impose penalties on states that failed to comply with the plan.'72 As a result,
little progress was made in siting additional LLW facilities.173 In 1985, Con-

'6 New York, 505 U.S. at 190-91; Rabe et al., supra note 156, at 78.

165 Kearney, supra note 8, at 60; see also Mostaghel, supra note 158, at 385 (noting that
all states wanted to be able to choose disposal sites, rather than have them imposed by the
federal government).
' 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021d (2006).
167 Id. § 2021e(e)(1)(B)(i) (2006). Although the LLW Act delegated the siting process to
the states, substantive requirements for site selection, licensing, and regulation continued to be
set at the federal level by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. See 10 C.F.R. §§ 61.40-61.44,
61.50 (2010).
168 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(a) (repealed 1986) ("After January 1, 1986, any such compact may
restrict the use of the regional disposal facilities under the compact to the disposal of low-level
radioactive waste generated within the region."); New York, 505 U.S. at 151 ("The 1980 Act
authorized States to enter into regional compacts that, once ratified by Congress, would have
the authority beginning in 1986 to restrict the use of their disposal facilities to waste generated
within member States.").
169 Rabe et al., supra note 156, at 78.
170 See, e.g., Kearney & Stucker, supra note 153, at 216.
' See New York, 505 U.S. at 151; William F. Newberry, The Rise and Fall and Rise and
Fall of American Public Policy on Disposal of Low-Level Radioactive Waste, 3 S.C. ENVrTL.
L.J. 43, 50 & n.33 (1995) (describing ongoing state resistance).
172New York, 505 U.S. at 151.
" Id.; 131 CONG. REC. 34,809 (1985) (statement of Sen. Bradley (D-N.J.)) ('The failure
to achieve the intended result of the 1980 act can be largely attributed to the act's lack of
clearly defined incentives and penalties that would induce the establishment of new disposal
capacity within the non-sited compact regions."); L. David Condon, The Never Ending Story:
Low-Level Waste and the Exclusionary Authority of Non-Compacting States, 30 NAT. RE-
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gress amended the LLW Act, providing incentives to site additional facilities
and imposing penalties on states that failed to do so.174 The amendments
embodied a compromise between the three states with LLW facilities and the
rest of the country, whereby the sited states agreed to continue to accept
LLW from other states for an additional seven years, and the unsited states
agreed to establish alternative disposal facilities in that time.1 5
Notably, the LLW Amendments did not preempt state and local laws
that prevented the siting of such LLW facilities. Rather,
[flederal legislation gave considerable freedom to individual
states and compacts in designing their own siting procedures.
Once Congress formally approved compacts, local siting authorities devised their own methods of site selection .

. .

. As long as

state and compact siting strategies did not violate related federal
laws, including the National Environmental Policy Act, states were
free to devise any siting strategy.'7 6
In lieu of preemption, the LLW Amendments provided three types of
incentives to pressure states to meet their obligation to dispose of waste generated within their borders."'7 First, the Act provided financial benefits to
states that met a series of siting deadlines.178 Second, the Act imposed increased disposal charges on states that missed the interim deadlines and also
restricted their access to existing disposal sites.'79 Third, and most importantly, the LLW Amendments required states that had not provided for disposing of the LLW generated within their borders by 1993 to "take title" to
it, thereby assuming liability for any damage it caused. 80
New York chose to comply with the Act by constructing a disposal
facility within its own borders.' 8' Although New York identified five poten-

J. 65, 68 (1990) (explaining that the incentives for compelling states to site facilities
were insufficient).
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, 42 U.S.C.
17 Low-Level
§§ 2021b-2021j (1985).
"' Id. §§ 202le(a), (c).
116 Rabe et al., supra note 156, at 81. Thus:
SOURCES

Federal law made the states responsible for disposal of low-level waste, but they did
not tell the states how to do the job. Except for the milestone framework in the 1985
law . . . the states essentially were working from a blank slate.
Newberry, supra note 171, at 57.
" New York, 505 U.S. at 152-54.
178 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021e(dHe) (establishing the interim siting deadlines and financial
awards for reaching certain milestones).
"' See 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e) (imposing escalating surcharges on states that failed to meet
interim siting deadlines).
18042 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C); see also Ryan, supra note 17, at 34 (describing the "taketitle" provision as "the most severe penalty under the new plan, and that most expected to
motivate compliance").
181New York, 505 U.S. at 154.
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tial sites, surrounding residents strongly opposed each choice.182 In 1990,
having failed to make progress in siting a facility, New York challenged the
constitutionality of the LLW Amendments.8 3 In New York v. United States,
the Supreme Court famously invalidated the "take-title" provision as a violation of states' rights under the Tenth Amendment, but upheld the balance of
the statute.'14
In the nearly twenty years since the Supreme Court's New York decision, virtually nothing has been done by the states or Congress to address the
low-level radioactive waste disposal problem.' Despite early optimism that
a state-based approach would more effectively site regional LLW disposal
facilities, not a single new facility has been built as part of the regional
compacts authorized by the Act.'86
The nation is still served by just three LLW disposal facilities, only one
of which will accept LLW generated outside of its regional compact.'8 7 After
reopening and closing several times, Nevada closed the Beatty site permanently in 1992.18 Since the Beatty site closed, one existing hazardous waste
facility in Clive, Utah was licensed to accept the least hazardous type of
LLW.'" 9 The Richland, Washington site remains open, but only accepts waste
from states within its regional compact.'" The Barnwell, South Carolina site
continued to accept nationwide waste until July 1, 2008, when it exercised

Id.; see also Sam Howe Verhovek, Nuclear Dump Plan Ignites Rural Protests, N.Y.
Sept. 19, 1989, at B I (describing the locations chosen and local opposition to the sites).
'" New York, 505 U.S. at 154.
TM
' Id. at 145.
1' Ryan, supra note 17, at 50-55 (describing the aftermath of New York and noting that
"[n]either Congress nor the states have meaningfully wrestled with the resulting regulatory
'hot potato' since then, each side seeming to conclude from their loss in court that the status
quo is really the other's problem.").
' See Low-Level Waste Disposal, supra note 18 ("Most states have entered into compacts; however, no new disposal facilities have been built since the Act was passed."); see also
Gerrard, supra note 17, at 1082-83 (describing several failed attempts to site LLW facilities
following New York); Kearney, supra note 8, at 63 (describing the "turmoil" in state siting
efforts); Mostaghel, supra note 158, at 400-02 (describing Michigan's stalling tactics after
being designated a host state by its regional compact).
' The facilities are located in Barnwell, South Carolina; Richland, Washington; and
Clive, Utah. Locations of Low-Level Waste Disposal Facilities, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMM'N, http://www.nrc.gov/waste/llw-disposallicensing/locations.html
(last updated Mar.
24, 2009). Clive, Utah permits the depositing of waste in its facility, irrespective of its origin.
Id.
' See Richard R. Zuercher, Nevada Accord Closes Beatty LLW Facility Permanently,
NUCLEONICS WK., Nov. I1, 1993, at 6; see also Squeeze on Wastes, CHEMICAL WK., Apr. 12,
1978, at 21 (commenting on the tense relations between Nevada, Washington, and South Carolina over site closures).
' GAO Low-LEVEL WASTE, supra note 18, at 31 (providing overview of Clive site);
Ledoux & Cade, supra note 18, at 3; Locations of Low-Level Waste Disposal Facilities, supra
note 187.
'9 GAO Low-LEVEL WASTE, supra note 18, at 35 (providing an overview of Richland
site); Ryan, supra note 17, at 53.
182

TIMES,

Process Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes

2011]

317

its authority under the LLW Act to refuse to accept shipments of waste from
outside its regional compact.19 '
LLW that is not accepted at one of the three existing facilities is stored
primarily at the site where it was produced, such as hospitals, research facilities, clinics and nuclear power plants.192 Particularly since the events of September 11, 2001, the on-site storage of radioactive material-even relatively
less hazardous LLW-raises national security concems.193 Thus, the LLW
Act's state-based approach to a national siting problem failed to achieve its
ultimate goal of ensuring the safe, nationwide disposal of LLW as states,
plagued by local opposition, refused to meet their voluntarily assumed compact obligations.
B.

Process Preemption: Federal-LocalInteraction in
Telecommunications Siting

The Supreme Court's decision in New York v. United States prompted
scholars and policy experts to analyze the failed federal siting efforts.194 At
around that same time, Congress began to consider comprehensive national
telecommunications legislation designed to accelerate "private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and information technologies." 95
Unlike the all-or-nothing approach of the Waste Siting Policies, the TCA's
Telecommunications Siting Policy utilizes a mix of regulatory actors to balance national communication goals with legitimate local siting concerns.196
Prior to the passage of the TCA, telecommunications siting was hindered by inconsistent local permitting requirements' 97 and strong local opposition to cell phone towers.'98 To address these obstacles, Congress initially
'9' Ryan, supra note 17, at 51; see, e.g., Judy Fahys, Industry Recipe: Diluted N-Waste,
SALr LAKE TRIB., June 28, 2008 (reporting on the closure of Barnwell to all but three other
states as of July 2008).
92 GAO Low-LEVEL WASTE, supra note 18, at 20-21 (describing on-site storage options);
Radioactive Waste, Production, Storage, Disposal, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N,
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/brochures/br0216/ (last updated Nov. 3,
2010) (noting that LLW not accepted at one of the three disposal sites is stored on-site).
GAO Low-LEVEL WAsr, supra note 18, at 21.
" See, e.g., Gerrard,supra note 17, at 1050; Rabe et al., supra note 156, at 80; see also
Vicki Been, Compensated Siting Proposals: Is It Time to Pay Attention?, 21 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 787, 802-08 (1994); Jeffrey Wagner, That Was Then and This Is Now: An Economist's
Wish List for the LLRW Siting Paradigm, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 635, 635 (1998).
SH.R. REP No. 104-458, at 113 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
* Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 53, at 1088; see also Weiser, supra note 42, at 1739
(discussing cooperative federalism in the context of the TCA).
'1 See supra note 111-112 and accompanying text.
'9 Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 53, at 1088 (describing NIMBY opposition to telecommunications towers); see also Steven J. Eagle, Wireless Telecommunications, Infrastructure
Security, and the NIMBY Problem, 54 CATI. U. L. REV. 445, 455-57 (2005) (describing
NIMBY opposition to cell tower siting); David W. Hughes, When NIMBYs Attack: The
Heights to Which Communities Will Climb to Prevent the Siting of Wireless Towers, 23 J.
CORP. L. 469, 483 (1998) (noting that NIMBYs bring serious challenges to the industry
"[blecause the wireless industry must receive permission from local zoning boards to build
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considered a proposal that would have granted nearly exclusive siting authority over telecommunications towers to a federal agency.'" The House
"Facilities Siting Policies" called for the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") to establish a negotiated rulemaking committee to develop
substantive policies related to wireless facilities siting considering both the
national interest in enhancing coverage and the legitimate interests of state
and local governments in regulating the use of land within their own
borders.2 00
In contrast to the House Bill's complete federal preemption of local
zoning, the corresponding Senate Bill did not address telecommunications
siting at all.20 1 The House-Senate conference committee ultimately adopted a
more modest policy that left primary siting responsibility with local authorities, but placed several federal limitations on the siting process.2 02 According
to the conference committee report "The Conference agreement creates a
new § 704 which prevents Commission preemption of local and State land
use decisions and preserves the authority of State and local governments
over zoning and land use matters except in limited circumstances set forth in
the conference agreement."2 03 Substantively, the Telecommunications Siting
Policy advances the federal goal of establishing a nationwide telecommunications infrastructure by preventing localities from "unreasonably discriminat[ing] among providers of functionally equivalent services" and
new towers and antennas"); Martin, supra note 125, at 431 ("Local residents' primary concerns have been that proximity to a tower would create health hazards, would be aesthetically
unpleasant, and would lower property values.").
'" See H.R. REP. No. 104-204, at 25 (1995).
2" In developing such national siting policies, the committee was to consider:
(i) the desirability of enhancing the coverage and quality of commercial mobile services and fostering competition in the provision of such services; (ii) the legitimate
interests of State and local governments in matters of exclusively local concern; (iii)
the effect of State and local regulation of facilities siting on interstate commerce; and
(iv) the administrative costs to State and local governments of reviewing requests for
authorization to locate facilities ....
Id.
201 See generally S. 652, 104th Cong. (1995) (making no mention of telecommunications
siting); Petersburg Cellular P'ship v. Bd. of Sup'rs of Nottoway County, 205 F.3d 688, 697-98
(4th Cir. 2000) (noting difference between the House version, which would have empowered
the FCC to directly regulate the siting of towers, and the Senate version, which would have
allowed local zoning officials to retain that authority).
202 H.R. Rne No. 104-458, at 207-08 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). As others have noted, the distinction between process and substance is sometimes blurred. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (including plaintiffs substantive interests as one factor to be weighed
in determining the amount of process required to satisfy constitutional due process require-

ments); Thurman Arnold, The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal Process, 45

HARv. L. REV. 617, 643 (1932) ("The difference between procedure and substantive law is a
movable dividing line which may be placed wherever an objective examination of our judicial
institutions indicates is necessary."); Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court
Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEo. L.J. 887, 900-01,

910-14 (1999) (describing the substance-procedure connection and noting that choice of procedure both reflects substantive values and impacts substantive outcomes).
203 H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 207-08.

Process Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes

2011]

319

from "prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services."2 04 The Telecommunications Siting Policy also prohibits the regulation of wireless facilities based on the "environmental effects of radio frequency emissions to the
extent that such facilities comply with [FCC] regulations."2 05
Procedurally, the Telecommunications Siting Policy requires local governments to respond to any request for authorization to place or construct a
cell phone tower "within a reasonable period of time . . . taking into account

the nature and scope of such request."2 06 It further requires that the local
government response "be in writing and supported by substantial evidence
contained in a written record."2 07 In addition, the Telecommunications Siting
Policy creates a judicial right of action, allowing persons aggrieved under
the act to take their claims to federal court, and requiring the court to hear
and decide the claim on an expedited basis.2 08
These federal standards preempt conflicting or inconsistent state and
local regulations,2 09 but do not otherwise preempt state regulation of cell
tower siting. 210 Instead, like other cooperative federalist statutes, within the
confines of the Telecommunications Siting Policy states remain free to experiment with tower siting and tailor policies to local conditions and preferences. 211 North Carolina, for example, supplements the federal
Telecommunications Siting Policy with its own statewide statutory scheme
that seeks to curb practices that have prevented wireless coverage expansion

in the state. 2 12
Since the passage of the TCA, courts have worked to balance the twin
aims of the Telecommunications Siting Policy, weighing the federal interest
in deploying a national telecommunications network against the desire to
preserve state and local control over land use matters. 213 As the First Circuit
Telecommunications

Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I)-(II) (2006).
Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv).
20 Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii).
207 Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii).
208 See id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).
21 See id. § 332(c)(3)(A); see also supra
note 6.
210 The TCA explicitly states that "[e]xcept as provided in this paragraph,
nothing in this
Act shall limit or affect the authority of a State or local government or instrumentality thereof
over decisions regarding the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless
service facilities." 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A); see also Robert B. Foster & Mitchell A. Carrel,
Patchwork Quilts, Bumblebees, and Scales: CellularNetworks and Land Use Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 36 URB. LAW. 399, 399-400 (2004) (explaining that the TCA
"does not completely preempt local zoning authority" but rather places restrictions on local
discretion in the context of telecommunications facilities).
211 Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 53,
at 1088.
212 See generally Wireless Telecommunications Facilities Act, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 1692
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-400.50-.53 (2007)) (setting time limits within which
local government must respond to request to site a cell tower, requiring reasonable permit fees,
and limiting review of request to public safety and zoning concerns).
213 U.S. Cellular Corp. v. City of Wichita Falls, 364 F.3d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 2004) (observing that the Telecommunications Act balances national and local concerns); see also ATC
Realty, LLC v. Town of Kingston, 303 F.3d 91, 94 (1st Cir. 2002) (describing twin aims of
Siting Policy); Foster & Carrel, supra note 210, at 399 (same).
204
205
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observed, "The statute's balance of local autonomy subject to federal limitations does not offer a single 'cookie cutter' solution for diverse local situations ... . Congress conceived that this course would produce ... individual
2 14
solutions best adapted to the needs and desires of particular communities."
In contrast to the Waste Siting Policies, the Telecommunications Siting
Policy's Process Preemption regime has largely succeeded in accomplishing
federal land use goals. 2 15 In fact, since the Policy was enacted the number of
cell towers has dramatically increased, significantly contributing to the rapid
2 16
deployment of a national telecommunications network. Given the success
of the Telecommunications Siting Policy, the next Part seeks to develop a
theory of Process Preemption and assess its potential to inform future federal
siting regimes.

V.

A

THEORY OF PROCESS PREEMPTION

In most industrialized countries the siting of locally undesirable facilities, ranging from prisons to municipal landfills, to group homes for recovering addicts, and especially hazardous and nuclear waste disposal plants,
engenders intense public opposition. Such opposition often leads to drawn
out permitting processes, extended environmental studies, legal challenges,
217
Over the past
and in many cases, abandonment of the proposed facility.
few decades, regulators have experimented with a variety of siting techniques aimed at overcoming local opposition to these land uses, beginning
with approaches that focused on technical site screening and selection, moving to strategies that involved negotiating with and compensating host com218
munities, and, most recently, to processes that emphasize voluntary siting.
These innovations have increased public acceptance-and siting successTown of Amherst v. Omnipoint Commc'ns Enters., Inc., 173 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 1999).
See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
216 See Wireless Quick Facts, supra note 21; FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, FCC 10-81, IMPLE214
215

MENTATION OF SECIfION 6002(B) OF THE OMNIBUS RECONCILIATION Aci OF 1993: ANNUAL
REPORT AND ANALYSIS

OF COMPETYTIVE MARKET CONDYrIONS

WITH RESPECT TO MOBILE

WIRELESS, INCLUDING COMMERCIAL MOBILE SERVICES 9, 89-100 (2010), available at http://
hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-10-81Al.pdf (reporting current statistics on
wireless usage); Daniel A. Lyons, Technology Convergence and Federalism:Who Should Decide the Future of Telecommunications Regulation?, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 383, 398-402
(2010) (detailing technological advances since the Telecommunications Act).
217 Joanne Linnerooth-Bayer, Fair Siting Strategies for Hazardous Waste Facilities, in
MANAGING CONFLICT IN FACIIT Y SITING: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 36 (S.H. Lesbirel
and D. Shaw, eds., 2005); Munton, supra note 8, at 1, 9-10 (describing national and international NIMBY opposition to wide range of facilities); Rabe et al., supra note 156 (comparing
the American experience of low-level radioactive waste disposal siting to the Canadian experience); Laurie C. Malkin, Comment, Troubles at the Doorstep: The FairHousing Amendments
Act of 1988 and Group Homes for Recovering Substance Abusers, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 759
(1995) (describing public response to siting group homes for recovering substance abusers).
218 Roger E. Kasperson, Siting Hazardous Facilities: Searching for Effective Institutions
and Processes, in MANAGING CONFLIcr IN FACILITY SITING, supra note 217, at 13, 20-23
(describing voluntary siting techniques); Munton, supra note 8, at 10-23 (summarizing progression of siting strategies including "Decide, Announce, Defend," preemption, public partic-
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for certain facilities, such as solid waste treatment plants and prisons, but
have failed to increase successful siting of more controversial hazardous and
radioactive waste facilities. 219
Given its incredibly complex nature, with political, social, economic
and legal dimensions, a full analysis of the factors that impact siting success
is beyond the scope of this Article. 220 Moreover, this Article does not propose a generic siting strategy suitable for all federal regulatory programs.
Instead, this Article identifies two innovations of the Telecommunications
Siting Policy's Process Preemption regime relative to prior federal siting regimes and evaluates the potential for Process Preemption to aid in future
federal land use policies, including those involving hazardous waste
facilities.
In particular, this Part argues that Process Preemption has the potential
to contribute to a national siting program by (a) accounting for the interjurisdictional nature of a federal land use policy and (b) imposing procedural
constraints on the local land use decisionmaking process.
Section A argues that one failure of the Waste Siting Policies was its
binary, dual federalist approach to waste facilities siting, which empowered
the federal government to site high-level waste facilities and state governments to site low-level waste facilities. In contrast, Process Preemption accounts for the interjurisdictional dynamic by involving both federal and local
regulators in the siting scheme. 22 1
Section B argues that the procedural constraints imposed by Process
Preemption, including the requirement that decisions be made within a reasonable period of time, supported by substantial evidence contained in a
written record and subject to expedited federal judicial review, facilitate national land use goals by increasing the consistency and transparency of the
local decision-making process and allowing for more effective judicial review of zoning decisions.
Section C recognizes the limitations of Process Preemption as well as
its potential to further national land use priorities. Specifically, Process Preipation, negotiation and compensation, and the voluntary-choice process); Tarlock, supra note
155, at 613-14 (describing evolution of siting strategies).
219 Linnerooth-Bayer, supra note 217, at 36; see also Been, supra note 194, at 800-08
(detailing unsuccessful efforts to implement compensated siting for low-level radioactive
waste).
220 See, e.g., Linnerooth-Bayer, supra note 217, at 36 (listing elements common to successful siting regimes, including: (1) widespread agreement that the facility is needed to address a long-term problem; (2) that the facility must not impose unacceptable health and safety
risks; (3) that the community must be involved in the siting process; and (4) that the siting
process and outcome must be perceived as fair); Munton, supra note 8, at 2-3 (explaining that
NIMBY opposition to siting stems from a combination of factors including the problems of
providing public goods, local perception that facility siting process is undemocratic, concerns
over health and safety, and concerns about fairness and equity).
221 Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Commc'ns Enters., Inc., 173 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 1999)
(describing the Telecommunications Siting Policy as a "refreshing experiment in federalism"
and stating that "[t]he statute's balance of local autonomy subject to federal limitations" enables solutions tailored for diverse local situations).
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emption seems well suited to facilitate nationwide siting of renewable energy facilities, such as wind turbines and solar installations.22 2 In addition,
although Process Preemption is unlikely to overcome entrenched local opposition to siting centralized radioactive waste disposal facilities, it could play
a role in a reformulated national strategy emphasizing local storage of radioactive waste.
A.

An InterjurisdictionalApproach

A number of federal statutes that implicate local land use policies seem
to have recognized the crucial role that federal-local interaction plays in successful implementation of the federal scheme. 223 For example, the Coastal
Zone Management Act of 1972 ("CZMA"),2 24 enacted in response to growing concern regarding pollution of the nation's coastline, 225 establishes a federal policy that requires states to work with local governments to manage the
state coastline. 226 In particular, the CZMA requires states to create "an effective mechanism for continuing consultation and coordination" between a
designated state management agency and local governments within the
coastal zone "to assure the full participation of those local governments and
agencies" in implementing the Act. 227 In addition, if the management agency
administering the state program makes a decision that conflicts with local

222 Recently, several scholars have advocated for increased federal regulation of renewable energy siting to promote national renewable energy goals; Process Preemption provides a
model through which to channel federal intervention. See, e.g., Bronin, supra note 24, at 550
(arguing that to overcome state and local obstacles, Congress should require states to consider
model standards for alternative energy microgrids); Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman,
Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming Mar.-Apr. 2011) (arguing for the adoption of a
federal regulatory floor for the construction and physical location of distributed renewable
devices, such as wind turbines and rooftop solar panels); Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 53, at
1091-97 (arguing for the enactment of a federal wind siting policy).
223 The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 emphasizes the need for interjurisdictional coordination between federal, state, and local governments to establish and implement a national
program for pre-disaster mitigation and administration of disaster relief. 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b)
(2006); see also FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, MULTI-HAZARD MITIGATION PLANNING
GUIDANCE UNDER THE DIsASTER MITIGATION ACT OF 2000 v (2004), availableat http://www.
fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=3115. The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006), and
the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, 23 U.S.C. §§ 110-166 (2006), similarly

take local governments and local planning efforts into account. See Buzbee, supra note 28, at

93-94.
224

16 U.S.C §§ 1451-1465 (2006).
supra note 28, § 3:3 ("The Act was a response to a growing concern that the

225 SALKIN,

nation's coasts were becoming polluted due to the 'piecemeal development of coastal ecosystems without an overall strategy for comprehensive coastal management.'") (citing 118 CONG.

REc. 14,170-71 (1972) (statement of Sen. Hollings(D-S.C.))).
226 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(1). See also, SALKIN, supra note 28, § 3.3 ("The drafters of
CZMA recognized that for the Act to be successful, it needed to be implemented at the local
level, given that significant
municipalities.").
227

16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(1).

land
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law, the agency must send notice to the local government and allow a 30-day
comment period.228
In contrast, the federal Waste Siting Policies' dual federalism approach
fundamentally misses the interjurisdictional nature of the radioactive wastesiting problem. The NWPA assumed that siting a high-level hazardous waste
facility was purely a federal matter, and therefore adopted an aggressively
preemptive approach that entirely excluded participation by state and local
regulators.22 9 In contrast, the LLW Act adopted the view endorsed by the
National Governors' Association, treating LLW management primarily as a
land use issue, within the realm of traditional state authority.23 0
In reality, of course, radioactive waste siting implicates land use law, a
fundamental local concern, as well as a variety of federal concerns, including energy production, national security, and interstate commerce.23 ' Federal
siting regimes thus present a classic interjurisdictional regulatory problem
that cannot be effectively remedied by a regulatory regime that exclusively
empowers one level of government. Neither the federal government nor the
state governments acting alone have the capacity to implement federal siting
policies.232
As the Yucca Mountain debacle demonstrates, notwithstanding the federal government's formal legal authority to preempt local zoning regulations,
the federal government cannot simply preempt local political authority and
force an unwanted facility on a resistant community. 23 3 In his testimony
before the Blue Ribbon Commission on Nuclear Energy, John Gervers, a
consultant to the Clark County Nuclear Waste Division, noted that "the key
lesson to be learned from the Nevada experience is that public acceptance of
a siting process is an essential ingredient for success of any nuclear waste
storage or disposal system." 23 4 Indeed, siting conflicts throughout the country and internationally confirm that unilateral preemption of the siting pro-

228
229

Id. § 1455(d)(3)(B).
See supra notes 136-143.

230 Kearney, supra note 8, at 60; Rabe et al., supra note 156, at 78; see also supra notes
163-166 (noting that adoption of LLW Act recognized LLW siting as primarily a matter of
state and local concern).
231
See supra notes 130-134 (describing federal interest in radioactive waste
management).
232 Engel, supra note 73, at 159 (arguing that the static allocation of regulatory authority
to either the state or federal government obstructs good environmental management, and that
broadly overlapping state and federal regulatory jurisdiction is needed); Ryan, supra note 7, at
573 (noting that de jure interjurisdictional problems arise when neither side has all of the
jurisdiction needed to effectively solve the problem).
233 See supra Part IV.A.I.
234 John Gervers, Consultant, Clark Cnty. Nev. Nuclear Waste Div., A Local Government
Perspective on Intergovernmental Relations at the Yucca Mountain Project, Testimony before
the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future (July 7, 2010), http://brc.gov/
DisposalSC/docs/ClarkCountyTestimony7-7-10.pdf.
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cess almost always fails 235 and may even increase opposition to future siting
efforts.2 36 As Michael Gerrard wrote in the early 1990s:
One clear lesson of the past two decades is that adamant, sustained
citizen opposition, when backed by local government, almost always wins . . . . Most importantly, it shows that the widespread

practice of trying to preempt local control and force disposal facilities on unwilling communities is much like the medieval practice
of bleeding the sick: it is exquisitely counterproductive. Not only
does it never work, it actually increases opposition exponentially
by turning what might be a voluntary risk into an involuntary,
highly intrusive risk.2 37
Instead, to gain local cooperation, the local community must be involved in
the siting process, and local residents must feel that their concerns have been
addressed.2 38
At the same time, siting regimes that exclusively empower the states,
and by extension local governments, to site (or refuse to site) waste facilities
similarly lack the jurisdictional mechanisms needed to be effective. As Part
II explains, "local" land use creates a paradox. On the one hand, "local"
land use is desirable, as a theoretical matter, and necessary, as a functional
matter, because locally elected officials are in the best position to assess
local development needs and respond to local community concerns. 23 9 Yet,
as the NIMBY phenomenon vividly demonstrates, local land use decisions
have effects that extend far beyond municipal borders. In the absence of
countervailing federal or state policy there is no mechanism through which
to compel local decisionmakers to consider regional or federal interests in
the decisionmaking process. 240 As a result, locally elected officials are generally unwilling to force undesirable land uses on hostile communities, even in
the face of recognized national or regional need. 24 1
In contrast, Process Preemption accounts for the interjurisdictional nature of federal siting regimes. The Telecommunications Siting Policy establishes a regulatory framework that leaves primary siting authority in the
hands of local regulators, but places explicit substantive and procedural con235 Bingham & Miller, supra note 8, at 477 (explaining that "[slimply preempting local
controls ... is unlikely to resolve the siting dilemma because it does not address the causes of
opposition"); Munton, supra note 8, at 12 (noting that states can strip local officials of permitting power, but not political power to oppose siting decisions).
236 Gerrard, supra note 17, at 1152.
23
MId. at 1137, 1152.
238 Id. at I153-64; Gervers, supra note 234, at 2 (noting that "failure to acknowledge
community concerns can lead to political resistance and public demonstrations"); LinneroothBayer, supra note 217, at 36 (emphasizing importance of conmmunity involvement); Munton,
supra note 8, at 2 (noting that NIMBY opposition arises, in part, because the community feels
excluded from the democratic process).
239 See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.

* See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
See Fischel, supra note 52, at 881, 884-85; Kearney, supra note 8, at 63.

241
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straints on the decision-making process. The substantive constraints, which
preempt local ordinances that "unreasonably discriminate among providers
of functionally equivalent services," 242 "prohibit the provision of personal
wireless services," 243 or vary from FCC regulations governing radio fre-

quency emissions, 244 promote national interests by establishing baseline standards for telecommunications siting decisions. The procedural constraints,
discussed more fully in the next Section, create an express mechanism
through which to effectuate the substantive policy goals.
Process Preemption thus creates an antidote to the political process failure that sets in when local communities are exclusively empowered to regulate land use. 245 By imposing federal constraints on the local zoning process,
Process Preemption creates a legal mechanism that forces local officials to
look beyond their own borders and consider national priorities in local land
use decisions. At the same time, like the CZMA and other cooperative regimes, the Telecommunications Siting Policy is sensitive to local preferences
and permits local governments to tailor the implementation of the policy to
local geographical, social, and economic conditions. 246
B.

The Promise of Process

In addition to its interjurisdictional approach, a second crucial innovation of the Telecommunications Siting Policy, relative to other siting regimes, is its emphasis on local procedural safeguards. The Standard State
Zoning Enabling Act 247 adopted by most states in the early part of the 20th
century failed to establish uniform local procedures for administering zoning
regulations. 248 As a result, procedural protections in the zoning process vary
widely across jurisdictions. For example, though most jurisdictions require
that some form of notice be given to impacted landowners, 249 the form of
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I)-(II) (2006).
Id.
24 Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv).
245 Nolon, supra note 55, at 16.
246 In addition, others have noted that the Telecommunications Siting Policy's interjurisdictional approach encourages cooperation, rather than hostility, between land use developers and
zoning officials. According to John Nagle:
242
243

The combination of local authority constrained by federal law has encouraged municipal zoning officials to identify those places in their community where cell phone
towers would produce the least aesthetic harms, rather than trying to ban such towers
altogether .... The TCA also encourages cellular providers to research the propriety
of possible sites for a new cell phone tower rather than simply choosing a site and
then trying to force local officials to approve it.
Nagle, supra note 22, at 564.
247

ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING, supra note 35.

Edward Sullivan, The Time for State and Local Governments to Consider the ABA
Model Legislation for Land Use Procedures Is Now!, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEws, Feb. 12-13,
2009, at 11.
249 SALKIN, supra note 28, § 40:1 (summarizing notice requirements); 8 PATRICK J.
RoHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 51.04 (Mar. 2007) (explaining that state enabling
248
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notice required ranges from public notice in the form of a newspaper advertisement or posting on the property to mailed notice within a specified radius
of the affected property. 25 0
Moreover, board hearings may be so informal as to cast doubt on the
legitimacy of the proceedings; witnesses are rarely subpoenaed and frequently are not placed under oath; cross-examination is uncommon; and the
rules of evidence do not apply.2 51 Edward Sullivan, who led an American
Bar Association task force charged with developing fair procedures for the
enactment and administration of land use regulations, criticized the local
decisionmaking process for leaving applicants "in the midst of multiple
layered hearings, facing inadequate procedures before local boards and commissions that were not always competent to handle decision making in a
discretionary environment."252
Indeed, commentators concerned about the apparent ad hoc, discretionary nature of local land use decisionmaking have often argued for procedural
reforms as one way to check local discretion. 253 In 2008 the American Bar
Association task force responded by promulgating a Model Statute on Local
Land Use Processes ("ABA Model Code") intended to establish uniform
and fair procedures for land use decision-making. 254
The Telecommunications Siting Policy similarly imposes procedural
safeguards by requiring that siting decisions be (1) made within a reasonable
period of time; (2) supported by substantial evidence contained in a written
record; and (3) subject to expedited federal judicial review.255 The overall
impact of these procedural constraints is to increase the transparency and
consistency of the local siting process and facilitate judicial review of individual siting decisions. Moreover, procedural protections can enhance the
acts and municipal ordinances generally provide that notice of an administrative zoning hearing must be given to all parties and anyone else who might otherwise be interested in the
subject proceedings).
250 SALKIN, supra note 28, § 40:1.
251 Id.; Daniel R. Mandelker, Model Legislation For Land Use Decisions, 35 URB. LAW.
635, 639 (2003) (describing decision-making under the SZEA as "chaotic" and noting that
"[h]earings are undisciplined with no real attempt at a fair process that includes necessary
procedural safeguards.").
252 Edward J. Sullivan, Chair'sMessage, 30 ST. & Loc. L. NEWS, Spring 2007, at 2, 14.
253 Mark Cordes, Policing Bias and Conflicts of Interest in Zoning Decisionmaking, 65

N.D. L. REv. 161, 169 (1989) ("Recognizing the entrenchment of zoning flexibility and to
some degree ad hoc decisionmaking, commentators have argued that more attention needs to
be paid to the manner and process by which such decisions are made."); Mandelker, supra
note 251, at 636 n.5 (arguing for reform "to provide a decision making process in which
administrative relief is routine and final decisions are required within a reasonable time.")
(internal citation omitted); Ostrow, supra note 29, at 717, 734-37 (recommending heightened
standard of judicial review); Erin Ryan, Zoning, Taking, and Dealing: The Problems and
Promise of Bargaining in Land Use Planning Conflicts, 7 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 337, 339

(2002) (recommending increased representation of concerned parties to counteract the "deallike" nature of decisionmaking).
254 MODEL STATUTE ON LOCAL LAND USE PROCESSEs (2008) [hereinafter ABA MODEL
CODE], available at http://new.abanet.org/sections/statelocal/PublicDocuments/report-tothehouse of delegates.pdf.
255 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B).
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public's perception of fairness in the decisionmaking process, increasing
public acceptance of the ultimate result. 256
1.

Decisions Within a Reasonable Time

Zoning boards confronted with controversial or unpopular proposals
often have an incentive to postpone making a decision either in the hopes
that substantial delay will increase costs for the developer and encourage
abandonment of the project,257 or in order to extract concessions from the
developer. 25 8 As others have noted, long delays in the zoning process call the
motives of regulators into question and undermine the legitimacy of the final
decision.25 9
Accordingly, the recently adopted ABA Model Code sets time limits
within which land use decisions must be made and requires the zoning board
to refund application fees if these deadlines are missed. 260 The comments
explain:
[I]t is one of the fundamental elements of due process that a decision maker must come to a final decision within a reasonable period of time. Certainty is one of the goals of the land-use
decisionmaking process . .. and a failure by a local government to

decide either way on a development permit application destroys
certainty. 261

256 See Jessica Mantel, Procedural Safeguardsfor Agency Guidance: A Source of Legitimacy for the Administrative State, 61 ADMIN. L. REv. 343, 377-79 (2009) (citing studies that

"found that individuals' judgments about the fairness of the government's decision-making
process, rather than the decisions themselves, dominate how individuals generalize from their
own experience to their overarching views on the legitimacy of government authorities");
Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1278 (2009)
(noting that "reason-giving fosters democratic legitimacy because it both embodies, and provides the preconditions for, a deliberative democracy that seeks to achieve consensus on ways
of promoting the public good").
257 ABA MODEL CODE, supra note 254, § 210 (noting that in the absence of monetary
consequence "a dilatory local government would have a strong incentive to do nothing with a
controversial permit application"); see also Snyder-Westerlind Corp. v. Mayor of Atil. Highlands, 341 A.2d 687, 689 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (observing that municipal officials
may fail to act in order to discourage an applicant or because "an application presents a politically unpopular atmosphere"); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Borough of E. Lansdowne, 227 A.2d
664, 666 (Pa. 1967) (noting that "a Board could effectively prevent the erection of needed
structures through the simple process of luxurious lolling while spiders of inattention spin
webs of indifference over pending public problems").
258 Cordes, supra note 253, at 167 (noting that "delayed and flexible decision-making also
provides municipalities with significant leverage over potential development in order to obtain
developer concessions").
259 Eagle, supra note 198, at
493.
2
1 ABA MODEL CODE, supra note 254, § 210.
261 Id. § 210 cmt.
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A number of jurisdictions similarly require that zoning decisions be made
within a reasonable period of time. 262 Such limitations are designed to expedite the board's decision and to provide the applicant with speedy notice of
the status of his application.2 63
The Telecommunications Siting Policy requires local governments to
act on telecommunications siting requests within a reasonable time "taking
into account the nature and scope of such request." 264 The legislative history
indicates that in requiring that zoning decisions be made within a "reasonable" time, Congress did not intend "to give preferential treatment to the
personal wireless service industry in the processing of requests, or to subject
their requests to any but the generally applicable time frames for zoning

decision [sic]." 265

Still, the reasonableness requirement prevents zoning boards from stalling by providing a basis for applicants to challenge indefinite, unjustified
permitting delays. Courts have held that local authorities failed to act within
a reasonable period of time when they have unnecessarily kept applicants
"tied up in the hearing process through invocation of state procedures, moratoria, or gimmicks." 266 At the same time, requiring decisions within a "reasonable" time does not compel local authorities to forgo a thorough
investigation of the proposed application. 267 Instead, Congress chose a relatively flexible "reasonable" time requirement to allow local authorities to
consider the particular merits of each application. 268
262 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-7d(a) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Feb. Reg.
Sess., June Sp. Sess., and July Sp. Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-752(b) (West, Westlaw
through 2010 Reg. Sess.); 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 10508 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg.
Sess. and First Sp. Sess.); see also SALKIN, supra note 28, § 40:47 (providing a general overview of the laws governing delays in zoning board decisions).
263 See Miles v. Foley, 752 A.2d 503, 508 (Conn. 2000); see also Carolyn W. Poulin,

Comment, Land Use Applications Not Acted Upon Shall Be Deemed Approved: A Weighing of

the Interests, 57 UMKC L. REv. 607, 614 (1989) (discussing the purposes of deemed approval
statutes).
2" 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) (2006).
265 H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 208 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); see also N.Y. SMSA Ltd. P'ship v.
Riverhead Town Bd., 118 F. Supp. 2d 333, 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), af'd,45 F. App'x 24 (2d Cir.
2002) (finding that the term "reasonable" was used to allow zoning boards flexibility in the
amount of time they have to consider each application given the nature of the request).
266 Masterpage Commc'ns, Inc. v. Town of Olive, N.Y., 418 F. Supp. 2d 66, 77 (N.D.N.Y.
2005) (internal citations omitted); see also USCOC of Greater Missouri, LLC v. City of Ferguson, Mo., No. 4:07-CV-1489(JCH), 2007 WL 4218978, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 29, 2007) (internal citations omitted) (warning that local authorities should not transform the application
process into a "self-perpetuating, endless odyssey").
267 See, e.g., N.Y. SMSA Ltd. P'ship v. Town of Riverhead, 45 F. App'x. 24, 27 (2d Cir.
2002) (explaining that the "reasonable time" requirement includes time required to comply
with state environmental review); Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. City of Medina, 924 F. Supp. 1036,
1040 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (indicating that a moratorium on siting is permitted if required to
evaluate applications and gather information).
268 N.Y. SMSA Ltd. P'ship, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 341 (finding that "the term 'reasonable' was
no doubt used to allow local authorities the flexibility to consider each application on its
individual merit" and that "what is reasonable will necessarily depend upon the nature and
scope of each request.").
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Of course, Congress could have assured even more timely decisionmaking by including an express time limit, for example a requirement that
denials of telecommunications siting permits be made within 60 or 180 days.
Establishing an explicit time frame at the outset of the regulatory policy,
however, would have risked locking in a suboptimal regulatory choice. 269
Instead, the relatively flexible "reasonable" time limit allowed the FCC and
local decisionmakers to gain practical experience and expertise in siting telecommunications facilities without fear of a ticking clock.
On the basis of this experience, in November 2009, after more than a
decade administering the Telecommunications Siting Policy and reviewing
siting decisions, the FCC issued a declaratory ruling to provide guidance on
the time frame that would be considered "reasonable" under the statute. 270
Under the FCC ruling, zoning boards must respond to requests for co-location within ninety days and requests for new tower construction within 150
days. 271 According to the FCC, the ruling "achieves a balance by defining
reasonable and achievable timeframes for State and local governments to act
on zoning applications while not dictating any substantive outcome on any
particular case or otherwise limiting State and local governments' fundamental authority over local land use." 27 2 The FCC's significant practical experience administering the Telecommunications Siting Policy under a flexible
reasonable time standard increases the likelihood that its ultimate ruling
fairly balances national telecommunications priorities and local siting
concerns. 273
2.

Decisions Supported by Substantial Evidence Contained in a
Written Record

a.

Written Record

Given the informal nature of proceedings before a zoning board, it is
not surprising that boards often fail to create adequate records of zoning
See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
Declaratory Ruling to Clarify Provisions of Section 332(c)(7)(B), 24 F.C.C.R. 13,994,
14,010 (Nov. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Declaratory Ruling]; see also Robert B. Foster, The Better
Part of Valor Is Co-Location:Recent Developments in JudicialReview of Land Use Regulation
of CellularTelecommunications FacilitiesUnder the TelecommunicationsAct of 1996, 42 URB.
269

270

LAW.

595, 601 (2010) (noting that "the FCC set these deadlines based on the actual practice it

saw in the record, with evidence that co-location applications require less time than standalone

tower applications").
271 Declaratory Ruling, supra note 270, at 14,010. Failure to make a ruling within these
time periods creates a rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness. Id.
272 Press Release, FCC Issues Declaratory Ruling Establishing Timeframes for State and
Locality Processing of Applications for Wireless Towers 1 (Nov. 18, 2009), availableat http://
hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edoes-public/attachmatch/DOC-294711AI.pdf; see also Declaratory Ruling, supra note 270, at 14,032 (Statement of Comm'r Robert M. McDowell) ("Our ruling

strikes an elegant balance between establishing a deregulatory national framework to clear
unnecessary underbrush, while preserving state and local control over tower siting.").
273 Foster, supra note 270, at 602; Weiser, supra note 42, at 1702-03.
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hearings. 274 Zoning determinations frequently lack clear findings of fact and
fail to explain the basis upon which the decision was made. 275 As a result, a
reviewing court may not have the information necessary to serve as a meaningful check on local discretion. 276
Recognizing the problem created by inadequate record keeping and ambiguous decision-making, the ABA Model Code requires that decisions on
land use permits be based upon and accompanied by a written statement
containing, among other things: (1) the facts relied upon in making the decision; (2) the regulations relevant to the decision; (3) responses to all related
issues raised by the parties during the hearing; and (4) any other conditions
that must be satisfied before a certificate of compliance can be issued.27 7The
Telecommunications Siting Policy similarly addresses this procedural shortcoming by requiring that denials of telecommunications siting applications
be in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written

record. 278
The effect of both the ABA Model Code and the Telecommunications
Siting Policy's writing requirements is to increase the transparency of the
zoning process. Transparency allows concerned parties, including developers, surrounding property owners, public officials and members of the community to understand governmental decisions, to detect improper motives,
and to hold decisionmakers accountable.2 79 A publicly available record of
zoning decisions imposes a check on the zoning process by allowing applicants and, significantly, courts to compare the results of similar applications
to detect inconsistent or arbitrary results. Thus, a writing requirement and
looming threat of constituent and judicial review create an incentive for zoning boards to exercise principled discretion. In addition, requiring zoning
boards to support their decisions in writing likely promotes more deliberative and rational decisionmaking, leading to better substantive results. 28 0
274 SALKIN, supra note 28, § 40:1 (noting that in many zoning hearings records are indifferently kept).
275 Id. ("[T]he decision itself may be so deficient in findings and so ambiguous as to its
rationale, that a reviewing court may have difficulty in determining what was decided and on
what basis.").
226 See id. § 40:44 ("If the court's power to correct clear abuses of discretion is to be
effectively exercised, the findings must disclose the facts upon which the board's determination rests.").
277 ABA MODEL CODE, supra note 254, at § 204(4); see also id. § 204(4) cmt. ("To avoid
confusion about what has been decided, a reasoned decision based on findings of fact is an
essential conclusion to the permit review process.").
278 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii)-(iii) (2006).
279 See Bressman, supra note 98, at 506; Staszewski, supra note 256, at 1278-84 (arguing
that public officials in a democracy can be held accountable by a requirement or expectation
that they give reasoned explanations for their decisions).
280
See Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CN. L. REV. 1, 9 (1972)
("[T]he giving of reasons helps the decision-maker himself in the effort to be fair and rational,
and makes it possible for others to judge whether he has succeeded."); Frederick Schauer,
Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REv. 633, 657-58 (1995) (noting that "the very time required to
give reasons may reduce excess haste and thus produce better decisions" and that a "reasongiving mandate will also drive out illegitimate reasons when they are the only plausible expla-
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Though the TCA's writing requirement imposes a procedural safeguard
on the zoning process, its failure to set out in more detail what must be
contained in the writing has led to much litigation. 28 1 For example, the Sixth
Circuit, adopting a standard first enunciated by the First Circuit, 28 2 has held
that "a governmental unit's decision must (1) be separate from the written
record, (2) describe the reasons for the denial, and (3) contain a sufficient
explanation of the reasons for the denial to allow a reviewing court to evaluate the evidence in the record that supports those reasons." 283 In contrast,
other courts accept less extensive writings, including the minutes of the
meeting at which the decision was made or a letter conveying the decision. 284
As with the reasonableness requirement described above, however, the
relatively vague writing requirement contained in the original statute has
allowed regulators time to gain experience siting telecommunications facilities and courts time to gain experience reviewing these decisions. At this
point, it may be appropriate for the FCC or Congress to issue guidance on
the writing requirement. In particular, if the goal of the writing requirement
is to increase the transparency and ultimate acceptability of siting decisions
as well as to facilitate judicial review, then the more fulsome standards of
the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of the TCA's writing requirement or the
ABA Model Code's standard should be adopted. Nevertheless, the very fact
of imposing a writing requirement adds a vital procedural check on telecommunications siting decisions, helping to insert the federal interest into the
local decisionmaking process.
b.

Substantial Evidence

In addition to the writing requirement, the Telecommunications Siting
Policy creates a judicial check on the local zoning process by requiring telecommunications decisions to be supported by a higher degree of evidence
than is traditionally required to uphold local zoning decisions. Judicial renation for particular outcomes"); Staszewski, supra note 256, at 1294-1303 (explaining that
the reasoned-decisionmaking requirement in the administrative law context is intended to ensure deliberative and public-focused decisionmaking, in part by forewarning agencies that the
failure to articulate the basis for a policy decision will result in judicial remand to the agency);
cf Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1695
(1984) (arguing that government behavior becomes constrained if the government is forced to
justify its conduct on the basis of some public value).
281 See, e.g., Eagle, supra note 198, at 467-68 (describing litigation over writing requirement); Martin, supra note 125, at 433-35 (same).
282 Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Todd, 244 F.3d 51, 60 (1st Cir. 2001).
283 New Par v. City of Saginaw, 301 F.3d 390, 395-96 (6th Cir. 2002); see also, MetroPCS, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 400 F.3d 715, 723 (9th Cir. 2005).
2" See, e.g., AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. Winston-Salem Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 172
F.3d 307, 312-13 (4th Cir. 1999) (secretary writing "denied" on application suffices); BellSouth Mobility, Inc. v. Parish of Plaquemines, 40 F. Supp. 2d 372, 377-78 (E.D. La. 1999)
(letter and documentary record enough; TCA does not require written reasons); PrimeCo Pers.
Commc'ns, L.P. v. Fox Lake, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1062 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (trustee minutes
satisfied the writing requirement).
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view of local land use decisions is notoriously deferential.285 In its landmark
decision of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the Supreme Court held

that a zoning ordinance violates due process only if it is "clearly arbitrary
and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare." 28 6 State courts generally accord local zoning
decisions a presumption of validity and refuse to overturn them unless they
are arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. 287 Federal courts apply an even
more deferential "shocks the conscience" standard to local administrative
acts.288
In contrast, the Telecommunications Siting Policy requires that all decisions to deny a wireless service facility's siting request be "supported by
substantial evidence contained in a written record."28 9 Although the term
"substantial evidence" is not defined in the statute, Congress indicated that
courts should employ "the traditional standard used for judicial review of
agency actions." 290 Generally, courts have interpreted this standard to require
"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion." 29 1
The "substantial evidence" standard is less deferential to local decision-makers than the traditional standards of judicial review in land use
cases. In Cellular Telephone Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, the Second Circuit

explained the impact of the substantial evidence requirement as follows:

285 SALKIN, supra note 28, § 15:3; Ostrow, supra note 29, at 729-30 (describing deferential standard of review); Charles L. Siemon & Julie P. Kendig, Judicial Review of Local Govemnment Decisions: "Midnight in the Garden of Good and Evil", 20 NOVA L. REv. 707,
712-15 (1996) (criticizing deferential review).
286 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
287 See, e.g., City of Lilbum v. Sanchez, 491 S.E.2d 353, 355 (Ga. 1997) (holding that
under the rational basis test "any plausible or arguable reason that supports an ordinance will
satisfy substantive due process"); Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 70 P.3d 47, 50 (Utah 2003)
(stating that zoning amendment decisions are upheld unless "arbitrary and capricious or otherwise illegal"); Prete v. City of Morgantown, 456 S.E.2d 498, 500 (W. Va. 1995) (upholding
zoning ordinances so long as not arbitrary and capricious). Even Planning Commission decisions that are not affirmed by the local legislative body are accorded legislative deference. See,
e.g., Harris v. Zoning Comm'n of New Milford, 788 A.2d 1239, 1251 (Conn. 2002) (upholding
zoning commission decisions unless they are "clearly contrary to law" or there was an "abuse
of discretion"); Markland v. Jasper Cnty. Planning & Dev. Dep't, 829 N.E.2d 92, 96 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2005) (same); Auger v. Town of Strafford, 931 A.2d 1213, 1216 (N.H. 2007) (applying
deferential reasonableness standard for review of planning board decisions).
288 See, e.g., Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 170 F.3d 258, 262-63 (2d Cir. 1999); Anderson v. Douglas County, 4 F.3d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 1993) (using a "truly irrational" standard).
289 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (2006).
2
H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 208 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
291 Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1999); see also
Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup Cnty., 296 F.3d 1210, 1218 (11th Cir. 2002); Sw. Bell Mobile
Sys., Inc. v. Todd, 244 F.3d 51, 58 (1st Cir. 2001); Telespectrum, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of
Ky., 227 F.3d 414, 423 (6th Cir. 2000); Omnipoint Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Pine Grove
Twp., 181 F.3d 403, 408 (3d Cir. 1999). In contrast, the Fourth Circuit has adopted a "reasonable legislator" standard that gives great weight to public opinion in evaluating whether a permit denial is supported by "substantial evidence." AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council
of Va. Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 430 (4th Cir. 1998).
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Traditionally, the federal courts have taken an extremely deferential stance in reviewing local zoning decisions, limiting the scope
of inquiry to the constitutionality of the zoning decision under a
standard of rational review. Although Congress explicitly preserved local zoning authority in all other respects over the siting of
wireless facilities, the method by which siting decisions are made
is now subject to judicial oversight. Therefore, denials subject to
the TCA are reviewed by this court more closely than standard
local zoning decisions.2 92

Though the substantial evidence standard is less deferential than the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review, it does not substitute local judgments with those of the judiciary. 293 Instead, the substantial evidence standard is keyed to the localities' own zoning code. 294 The Telecommunications
Siting Policy sets out the degree of evidence needed to support the zoning
decision, but the decision itself is to be made in compliance with substantive
state and local law. 295
In T-Mobile Central, LLC v. Unified Gov't of Wyandotte County/Kan-

sas, for example, the city denied T-Mobile's siting request in part because TMobile failed to demonstrate that a denial would prohibit the provision of
wireless service. 296 Both parties agreed that T-Mobile met the minimum criteria set out in the zoning code, which included set-back requirements and
landscaping requirements, among other things, but did not require applicants
to demonstrate that a denial would prohibit the provision of wireless service. 297 The Tenth Circuit held that the city did not base its decision on sub-

292 Cellular Tel. Co. (Oyster Bay), 166 F.3d at 493 (emphasis added) (citations omitted);
see also PreferredSites, LLC, 296 F.3d at 1218 (finding that "substantial evidence" standard
"requires courts to take a harder look than when reviewing under the arbitrary and capricious
standard"); BellSouth Mobility, Inc. v. Parish of Plaquemines, 40 F. Supp. 2d 372, 377 (E.D.
La. 1999) (noting that "substantial evidence" standard of review is more strict than usual
"arbitrary and capricious" standard).
293 T-Mobile Cent., LLC v. Unified Gov't of Wyandotte Cnty/Kansas City, 546 F.3d 1299,
1307 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted) ("While a reviewing court has no power to
substitute its own conclusions for those of the fact-finder . . . if the record as a whole contains
conflicting evidence, the fact-finder must adequately explain its reasons for rejecting or discrediting competent evidence . . . .").
294 USCOC of Greater Mo. v. City of Ferguson, 583 F.3d 1035, 1042 (8th Cir. 2009); TMobile Cent., LLC, 546 F.3d at 1307; U.S. Cellular Tel., LLC v. City of Broken Arrow, 340
F.3d 1122, 1133 (10th Cir. 2003); New Par v. City of Saginaw, 301 F.3d 390, 398 (6th Cir.
2002); Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Commc'n Enters., 173 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 1999).
295 Eagle, supra note 198, at 477 (noting that "federal law specifies the degree or quantum
of evidence needed to legitimize, under federal law, the exercise of legislative powers devolved upon local boards, under state law, to enforce substantive rights established by state
law"); see also Martin, supra note 125, at 433-34 (citing cases holding that substantial evidence must be based on existing state and local law).
296 546 F.3d at 1307-08.
297 Id. at 1303 n.2, 1307-08.
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stantial evidence because the city "invent[ed] a criterion" not required by
the local zoning ordinance.2 98
Critics of the substantial evidence standard worry that it will privilege
formal fact finding and prevent boards from properly considering local opinions and concerns over aesthetics and property values, which are not easily
reducible to empirical data. 2 99 However, courts have generally taken a more
practical approach, upholding permit denials based on aesthetic concerns
even when not supported by declines in market value, so long as the objections are tied to the particular tower and not to cell phone towers generally
or a misunderstanding of what the tower would actually look like.3 " For
example, the Eleventh Circuit has held that although "citizens' generalized
concerns about aesthetics are insufficient to constitute substantial evidence
. . . [a]esthetic concerns may be a valid basis for denial of a permit if sub-

stantial evidence of the visual impact of [a] tower" is presented.3 0 1Thus, the
TCA's substantial evidence requirement imposes a heightened judicial check
on local siting decisions while deferring to substantive state and local zoning
regulations.
3.

Federal JudicialReview

The federal judiciary has long resisted hearing land use cases, imposing
numerous procedural barriers to block access to the federal courts.3 02 As a
result, land use disputes are typically heard in state court. The Telecommunications Siting Policy creates a federal judicial right of action, allowing persons aggrieved under the Act to take their claims to federal court and
requiring the court to hear and decide the claim on an "expedited basis."3 03
In so doing, the TCA provides a federal forum for land use cases involving
telecommunications siting, signaling the national implications of telecommunications siting decisions.
298

Id. at 1307-08.

Christopher P. Terry, On the Frontiersof Knowledge: A Flexible SubstantialEvidence
Standard of Review for Zoning Board Tower Siting Decisions, 20 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J.
147, 156 (2002).
0 Eagle, supra note 198, at 478-79; see also T-Mobile Cent., LLC, 546 F.3d at 1312
(holding that "[m]ere generalized concerns regarding aesthetics are insufficient to constitute
the substantial evidence justifying the denial of an application to construct a wireless telecommunications facility").
30' Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup County, 296 F.3d 1210, 1219 (11th Cir. 2002).
302
STEVEN H. STEINGLASS, I SECTION 1983 LYTIGATION IN STATE COURTS § 6:16 (2010)
(noting that "federal courts are often reluctant to hear zoning and other land use cases and
have relied on abstention, preclusion, and their discretion to refuse to exercise pendent jurisdiction to limit access to federal court in § 1983 land use cases" (citations omitted)); Gregory
Overstreet, The Ripeness Doctrine of the Taking Clause: A Survey of Decisions Showing Just
How Far Federal Courts Will Go to Avoid Adjudicating Land Use Cases, 10 J. LAND USE &
ENvT.. L. 91, 92 (1994) (demonstrating that the procedural ripeness doctrine effectively excludes land use cases from federal court); Fischel, supra note 28, § 5 (noting that the Supreme
Court has imposed numerous procedural barriers to access to the federal courts).
303 47 U.S.C § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). The ABA Model Code similarly requires expedited judicial review of land use decisions. ABA MODEL CODE, supra note 254, § 610.
29
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Moreover, in contrast to federal judges who are appointed, and-once
confirmed by the Senate-enjoy life tenure, most state judges are elected by
the local population and serve for terms, rather than for life.3 04 Some studies
have concluded that elected judges are more sensitive to local pressures and
public opinion than federal judges. 30 1 Particularly in the context of NIMBY
disputes, federal judges, who are presumably insulated from local politics,
may be able to approach siting conflicts from a more national perspective.
C.

The Future of Federal Process Preemption

With its emphasis on procedural safeguards and its innovative interjurisdictional approach, Process Preemption has the potential to facilitate
siting a variety of nationally significant land uses, including renewable energy structures and small-scale radioactive waste storage facilities.
1. Renewable Energy Siting

A majority of states have already adopted mandatory Renewable Portfolio Standards that require increasing percentages of electricity sold by utilities within each state to be produced from renewable sources, including
wind.I Congress has also been considering the adoption of a federal RPS
that would require electric utilities to produce increasing percentages of their
electricity from renewable sources, reaching approximately twenty-five percent by 2025.307
Wind power, in particular, receives overwhelming public support in national surveys.3 0s Advocates note that the advantages of wind energy include:
"(a) environmental benefits, such as reduced greenhouse gas emissions; (b)
3 RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, STATE AND LoCAL GOVERNMENT LAw 53
(West 6th ed. 2004); David E. Posen, The Irony of JudicialElections, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 265,
266 (2008) (noting that "the majority of U.S. states have subjected at least some of their courts
to popular elections; roughly ninety percent of state general jurisdiction judges are currently
selected or retained this way"); James Sample, Court Reform Enters the Post-CapertonEra, 58
DRAKE L. REV. 787, 791 (2010) (noting "thirty-nine states in which judges face election").
305 Posen, supra note 304, at 271 ("Elected judges are less independent than appointed
judges in the sense that the public can vote them out of office if it does not like their decisions."); Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, Court Politics: The PoliticalEconomy of Tort
Awards, 42 J.L. & EcoN. 157, 186 (1999) (finding that elected judges are more likely to

redistribute wealth from out-of-state businesses to in-state plaintiffs).
" For an updated map showing states with RPS, see PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE, RENEWABLE & ALTERNATIVE ENERGY AND PORTFOLLO STANDARDS, (2009), availa-

ble at http://www.pewclimate.org/sites/default/modules/usmap/pdf.php?file=5907.
30'7Davies, supra note 94, at 1341 (noting that over twenty-five proposals for a national
RPS have been introduced in the federal legislature); Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 53, at 1051
(describing federal RPS proposals). See generally Joshua P. Fershee, Moving Power Forward:
CreatingA Forward-LookingEnergy Policy Based on a NationalRPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1405
(2010) (discussing the benefits of implementing a national RPS, while indicating that supplemental energy legislation, including federal siting authority for transmission lines, is necessary
to ensure that the goals of a national RPS will be achieved).
300 Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 53, at 1063-64 (citing polls).
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economic benefits, including price stability, job creation, and new sources of
income for rural communities; and (c) national security benefits, achieved by
reducing national reliance on foreign oil."3 09
Despite national support, wind energy projects often face intense opposition at the local level.310 Indeed, the reaction of local communities has
prompted one prominent energy siting consultant to remark that "wind energy is fast becoming 'the mother of all NIMBY wars."" In contrast to
hazardous waste facilities, however, local objections to wind turbine siting
revolve less around unacceptable health and safety concerns, and more
around standard development considerations, including concerns over aesthetic impacts; noise; negative impacts on property values, tourism, and recreational opportunities; negative environmental impacts caused by turbine
construction; and negative impacts on birds, bats, and other wildlife.3 12
A Process Preemption regime that is part of an overall federal renewable energy policy could greatly facilitate wind energy siting. As with telecommunications siting, a federal wind siting policy, or more broadly,
renewable energy siting policy, would compel local governments to consider
the extra-local impacts of their siting decisions without depriving local officials of their traditional land use regulatory authority.3 13 Moreover, Process
Preemption would increase regulatory uniformity, facilitating the development of nation-wide renewable energy infrastructure, without unduly compromising the ability of local officials to respond to local conditions.3 14

3

Id., at 1055-56.

Martin, supra note 125, at 428-39; see also Mark Clayton, America's Future Wind
Web?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 19, 2009, at 25 (describing local opposition to transmission lines); Robert D. Kahn, Siting Struggles: The Unique Challenge of Permitting Renewable
Energy Power Plants, ELECTRICITY J., Mar. 2000, at 21, 26 (describing NIMBY opposition to
the Kenetech Windpower project in the early 1990s, where residents from over thirty miles
away complained about "visual pollution"); Op-Ed., Wind Power, Rhetoric, ALBANY TIMEsUNION, Oct. 8, 2008, at A 10 (describing NIMBY opposition to wind energy project in upstate
New York).
"' Marty Durlin, Op-Ed., Wind Farms-Not in My Backyard, RulDoso NEWS (N.M.),
Mar. 19, 2009, at A4 (statement of Bob Kahn, head of Strategic Communications, a Seattlebased firm that helps wind farms gain siting permits).
312 Martin, supra note 125, at 441-50 (describing local objections to wind siting); Salkin
& Ostrow, supra note 53, at 1071-76 (assessing local concerns regarding wind turbine siting).
31 See generally Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 53 (proposing federal wind siting policy
modeled on the Telecommunications Siting Policy).
314 Inconsistent local land use requirements increase the costs, and reduce the feasibility,
of some renewable energy projects. See Bronin, supra note 24, at 571-72; Salkin & Ostrow,
supra note 53, at 1086-87; see also, U.S. DEPT OF ENERGY, 20% WIND ENERGY BY 2030:
INCREASING WIND ENERGYS CONTRIBUTION TO U.S. ELECTRICITY SUPPLY 119 (2008) (finding
that "[fi]ncreased uniformity of regulatory requirements across regions would greatly facilitate
the increased deployment of wind projects necessary to reach [federal renewable energy
goals]").
310
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Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities

Although Process Preemption has succeeded in siting telecommunications facilities, this Article does not contend that Process Preemption alone
would succeed in overcoming local opposition to siting waste disposal facilities. Critically, while cell phone towers raise significant health concerns,315
they do not generate the same fear and loathing as do hazardous waste facilities.3 16 According to Don Munton:
Hazardous waste facilities evoke extreme dread. Although cause
and effect is impossible to pinpoint with scientific certainty, community residents suspect high rates of illness, rare cancers, miscarriages, birth defects, and deformities in live stock are caused by
hazardous waste incinerator emissions or releases of toxic chemicals that migrate through the soil and contaminate nearby surface
waters and groundwater aquifers."'
Case studies suggest that it is difficult to overcome local opposition to
facilities that are perceived to be unacceptably hazardous, as is the case with
radioactive waste sites."'1 In these cases, increased safety measures are unlikely to be viewed as making the facility safe enough.3 19 Moreover, offers of
compensation at best have no effect, and may even have a negative effect on
local acceptance of radioactive waste facilities.32 0 If residents believe a facil315 See, e.g., Carrie Hyman & Marcia Zina Mager, Children, Cell Phones, and Health: An
Inconvenient Truth About A Convenient Technology, ORGANIC LIFESTYLE MAG., Oct. 2009, at
18, available at http://www.organiclifestylemagazine.com/issue-9/children-cell-phones-health.
php (noting that there are more than 2,000 independent studies linking electromagnetic fields
with serious health issues, such as Alzheimer's and Parkinson's disease, Autism, Attention
Deficit Disorder and a variety of cancers); Taraka Serrano, Cell Phone Towers: How Far Is
Safe?, EMF-HEALTH.COM (2007), http://www.emf-health.com/articles-celltower.htm (describing two studies that concluded that living near a cell phone tower could have a negative impact
on health). The American Cancer Society, however, has summarized findings on health impacts of cell phone towers and concludes that they are unlikely to cause cancer. CellularPhone
Towers, AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, http://www.cancer.org/Cancer/CancerCauses/OtherCarcinogens/AtHome/cellular-phone-towers?sitearea=PED (last updated June 25, 2010).
36 Kearney, supra note 8, at 63; see Eileen Gauna, LNG Facility Siting and Environmental (In)justice: Is it Time for a NationalSiting Scheme?, 2 ENvTL. & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 85,
89 (2007); Gerrard, supra note 17, at 1137-38.
317 Munton, supra note 8, at 1.
31' Linnerooth-Bayer, supra note 217, at 36 (concluding that it is difficult to gain community approval for siting facilities that evoke perceptions of high risk); see also Lawrence S.
Bacow & James R. Milkey, Overcoming Local Opposition to Hazardous Waste Facilities:The
Massachusetts Approach, 6 HARv. ENvrTL. L. REV. 265, 267-69 (1982) (describing the generally intense local opposition to hazardous waste facilities).
39 Linnerooth-Bayer, supra note 217, at 36.
320 Hank C. Jenkins-Smith & Howard Kunreuther, Mitigation and Benefits Measures as
Policy Tools for Siting Potentially Hazardous Facilities:Determinants of Effectiveness and
Appropriateness, in MANAGING CONFLICT IN FACILITY SITING: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON, supra note 217, at 63; Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action,
and Lw 102 MicHf. L. REV. 71, 87-89 (2003) (noting intense opposition from "those who
believe that societal benefits and burdens in general, and the burdens associated with the facility in question in particular, are being distributed inequitably"); Pefialver, supra note 44, at
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ity is unacceptably hazardous, they will view compensation as a bribe and
will oppose the facility no matter how great the compensation.3 2 1 Unless the
public believes that radioactive waste can be safely disposed of, finding acceptable sites for radioactive waste facilities will continue to prove quite
difficult, regardless of the federal constraints imposed on the siting process.
At the same time, a number of recent events-including the DOE's renewed interest in nuclear power, the closure of the Barnwell, South Carolina
disposal facility to nationwide waste, the abandonment of the Yucca Mountain site, and the international concern regarding the ongoing nuclear crisis
in Japan-create an urgent need for new solutions.
While some experts continue to search for more effective siting strategies in the context of radioactive waste,3 22 others have argued that the inability to site radioactive waste facilities should serve as a powerful incentive to
reevaluate the technology and consider alternatives.323 Still others advocate
abandoning the search for a centralized nuclear repository and adopting a
strategy that utilizes above-ground dry container storage facilities dispersed
throughout the country.3 24 The recently established Blue Ribbon Commission
on America's Nuclear Future is charged with studying each of these possibilities, as well as with recommending legislation to aid in accomplishing
federal goals.325
Thus, the current siting stalemate could change if the national policy
regarding radioactive waste disposal shifted from searching for large, centralized disposal facilities to smaller, more easily located, local storage facilities.326 In fact, local storage is the de facto method of radioactive waste
845-46 (surveying literature on compensation and concluding that compensation will have
little effect where facilities are opposed on grounds other than concern regarding property
values).
321 MICHAEL GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, WHOSE RISK 126 (1994); Jenkins-Smith &
Kunreuther, supra note 320, at 65; Munton, supra note 8, at 17. In contrast to radioactive

waste facilities, empirical studies have demonstrated that compensation and other forms of
community benefits are likely to increase the percentage of the local community willing to
support other undesirable land uses, including prisons and land-fills. Jenkins-Smith &
Kunreuther, supra note 320, at 63-65 (citing studies).
322 See, e.g., Daigee Shaw, Visions of the Future for FacilitiesSiting, in MANAGING CONFLICTS IN FACILITY SrrING: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON, supra note 217, at 196; JenkinsSmith & Kunreuther, supra note 320, at 63; Kasperson, supra note 218, at 13.
323 See, e.g., Michael Thompson, Unsiteability: What Should It Tell Us?, 7 RISK 169
(1996). In particular, Thompson advocates temporary above-ground storage as a way to solve
short-term problems while giving policymakers time to develop a long-term solution. Id.
324 Indeed, the NRC has determined that these dry cask storage systems can safely store
nuclear waste for at least thirty years beyond a reactor's life. GAO NUCLEAR WASTE, supra
note 12, at 10; see also Nuclear Wasteland, supra note 144.
325 BLUE RI1BON COMM'N ON AMERICA'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 150; see also
GAO NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 12, at 22-29 (assessing the Yucca Mountain repository and
proposing two alternative options, including centralized storage at two locations or continued
on-site storage of nuclear waste); see also GAO Low-LEVEL WASTE, supra note 18, at 40-43

(evaluating alternative strategies for managing LLW).
326 See GAO NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 12, at 10 (describing potential for aboveground storage of waste); Munton, supra note 8, at 8-9 (describing trend away from permanent, large-scale plants to smaller, mobile units and alternative disposal technologies).
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management in this country, as all high-level radioactive waste, and much
low-level radioactive waste, is stored at the facility where it was produced.3 27
Though the NRC policy favors disposal over storage, the NRC allows indefinite on-site storage of LLW. 32 s
In contrast to centralized waste disposal facilities, small storage facilities, which potentially can be sited in any number of locations throughout a
jurisdiction, are perhaps amenable to a Process Preemption regime. The success of Process Preemption in telecommunications siting, and its potential
for success in wind energy siting, is likely due, in part, to the fact that cell
phone towers and wind turbines are physically smaller and less obtrusive
than waste disposal facilities.329 Thus, local decisionmakers often have a real
choice in deciding among the possible locations for a cell phone tower. On
the other hand, within any jurisdiction there are likely to be only one or two
viable locations for a large waste disposal facility, leaving unhappy regulators with even fewer siting choices.
Furthermore, any potential host community is likely to feel unfairly
burdened in housing a large waste disposal facility designed to serve a much
broader region.33 0 In fact, the few states with LLW disposal facilities have
expressed anger and frustration at being forced to accept a disproportionate
share of the nation's waste. 33 1 In contrast, cell phone towers are widely dispersed throughout the country, 332 distributing the burden of telecommunications siting more equitably among jurisdictions. Moreover, as the number of
cell phone users has exploded over the last decade,3 33 most citizens recognize
the value of increasing the number of cell phone towers.334 The burden of
327GAO NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 12, at 36-40 (noting that all nuclear waste is currently stored on-site); GAO Low-LEVEL WASTE, supra note 18, at 20-21 (noting that low-level
waste that is not accepted by one of the commercial disposal sites is stored on-site).
328
329

GAO Low-LEVEL

WASTE,

supra note 18, at 21.

For example, the LLW facility in Barnwell, South Carolina, is located on a 235
acre tract of land. Barnwell Facility, ENERGY SOLUTIONs, http://www.energysolutions.com/
customer-portal/barnwell-facility (last visited Mar. 5, 2011). In contrast, cellular phone towers
are usually mounted on top or on the side of existing structures, such as trees, water tanks, or
tall buildings. See Cellular Phone Towers, supra note 315.
330 Kahan, supra note 320, at 87-89 (describing negative impact of compensation on siting efforts); Munton, supra note 8, at 3 (noting that concerns regarding distributional equity
often underlie siting disputes).
31 See supra notes 157-163 and accompanying text.
332 Wireless providers must site an increasing number of cell towers in order to meet the
consumer demand for personal communication systems. See Hughes, supra note 198, at 481.
For a map depicting cell phone tower sites by state, see Cell Tower Location Maps Index,
CELLTOWERINFO.COM http://www.celltowerinfo.com/CellTowerLocationMapslndex.htm (last
visited Mar. 5, 2011).
3 FCC, TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE 11-4, chart 11.1 (2008), available at http://hraun
foss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-284932Al.pdf (describing growth of wireless
industry).
334

See, e.g., Jack Encarnacao, Good Reception: Cell-Tower OK Looks Probable, PATRIOT

Aug. 18, 2005, at 13 (describing "a watershed change in attitudes about the necessity
of cell towers" that has led to reduced public opposition to cell tower siting); Derrick Henry,
Mixed Signals on Cellphone Towers, N.Y TIMEs, Jan. 11, 2009, at CTI (noting that
"[clellphone towers have proliferated throughout New York City's suburbs in recent years,
LEDGER,
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siting a cell phone tower is, therefore, balanced by the tangible benefits of
increasing the quality and availability of local cell phone service.
Similarly, local storage facilities would more evenly distribute the burden of waste management across the country, rather than concentrating the
costs of waste disposal on one or two host communities. In addition, it is
possible that local communities would be more willing to accept the burden
of locally produced wastes because, as with cell phone towers, they benefit
from the activities that produced the waste33 5 in the form of higher paying
jobs and sophisticated medical care at hospitals using radioactive

medicine.33 6

In this context, a federal Process Preemption framework would empower local officials to site small storage facilities, subject to national substantive and procedural constraints on the siting process. Substantive
constraints might include preemption of local ordinances that ban such facilities from within the jurisdiction or that regulate the health and safety standards of such facilities, to the extent that the facilities comply with national
standards set by the NRC.
Procedural constraints might require that local decisions be made
within a reasonable period of time and be supported by substantial evidence
contained in a written record and subject to expedited judicial review. In this
way, Process Preemption could balance federal and local interests in radioactive waste facilities siting, furthering the national goal of safely disposing
of radioactive waste without alienating local officials and generating insurmountable community opposition.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Federal preemption of state autonomy is often controversial. It is even
more so when federal preemption impacts land use, an area long deemed to
be within the purview of local governments. This Article has examined three
federal siting regimes, two relating to the siting of radioactive waste facilities and one concerning the siting of telecommunication towers, to illustrate
the range of regulatory options available to Congress in crafting federal
policy.

often welcomed by municipalities and by residents who would benefit from the tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars a year that go into public coffers"); Leilani Albano, Los Angeles
Residents Fight Back Against AT&T Cell Phone Tower, L.A. WEEKLY BLors (Oct. 12, 2010,

6:10 PM), http://blogs.laweekly.com/informer/2010/10/los-angeles-residentsfight

ba.php

(noting that AT&T collected signatures from residents who supported the cell tower siting).
3. Kahan, supra note 320, at 88.
336 BARRY G. RABE, BEYOND NIMBY: HAZARDOUS WASTE SrflNG IN CANADA AND THE
UNrrED STATES 43 (1994) (higher paying jobs); id. at 142 (describing on-site storage of waste
produced at medical facilities); Susan L. Satter, Note, CongressionalRecognition of State Authority over Nuclear Power and Waste Disposal, 58 CHI.-KEr L. REv. 813, 833 (1982) (detailing medical treatments that produce LLW).
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Though express federal preemption of local land use authority might
appear, at first glance, to be the most effective method of siting nationally
relevant facilities, such federal preemption has largely failed to accomplish
federal goals. Experience convincingly demonstrates that sustained local opposition to a proposed land use is difficult to overcome through formal preemption of local authority. In addition, aggressive federal preemption is at
odds with modem theories of cooperative federalism, which rely on multiple
layers of government to achieve federal policy goals.
Complete federal delegation of siting authority to states, which in turn
empower local governments to exercise this authority, has similarly failed to
achieve federal siting goals. Regimes that exclusively empower local decisionmakers flounder because locally elected officials tend to focus exclusively on the well being of their own residents to the detriment of outsiders.
In the absence of countervailing federal or state policy, there is no mechanism through which to compel local decisionmakers to consider regional or
federal interests in their decisionmaking process.
In contrast to a regime that places siting authority entirely within one
level of government, Process Preemption is an interjurisdictional approach
that places federal substantive and procedural constraints on the local siting
process. This Article demonstrates that Process Preemption's innovative use
of federal and local regulators, combined with its emphasis on procedural
safeguards, effectively balances national and local land use priorities, and
increases the legitimacy and public acceptance of controversial siting
decisions.

